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In this dissertation, we design and analyze five authentication protocols that answer
to the affirmative the following five questions associated with the authentication
functions in computer networks.
1. The transport protocol HTTP is intended to be lightweight. In particular,
the execution of applications on top of HTTP is intended to be relatively
inexpensive and to take full advantage of the middle boxes in the Internet. To
achieve this goal, HTTP does not provide any security guarantees, including
any authentication of a server by its clients. This situation raises the following
question. Is it possible to design a version of HTTP that is still lightweight and
vii
yet provides some security guarantees including the authentication of servers
by their clients?
2. The authentication protocol in HTTPS, called TLS, allows a client to authenti-
cate the server with which it is communicating. Unfortunately, this protocol is
known to be vulnerable to human mistakes and Phishing attacks and Pharm-
ing attacks. Is it possible to design a version of TLS that can successfully
defend against human mistakes and Phishing attacks and Pharming attacks?
3. In both HTTP and HTTPS, a server can authenticate a client, with which
it is communicating, using a standard password protocol. However, standard
password protocols are vulnerable to the mistake of a client that uses the same
password with multiple servers and to Phishing and Pharming attacks. Is it
possible to design a password protocol that is resilient to client mistakes (of
using the same password with multiple servers) and to Phishing and Pharming
attacks?
4. Each sensor in a sensor network needs to store n − 1 symmetric keys for
secure communication if the sensor network has n sensor nodes. The storage
is constrained in the sensor network and the earlier approaches succeeded to
reduce the number of keys, but failed to achieve secure communications in the
face of eavesdropping, impersonation, and collusion. Is it possible to design
a secure keying protocol for sensor networks, which is efficient in terms of
computation and storage?
5. Most authentication protocols, where one user authenticates a second user,
are based on the assumption that the second user has an “identity”, i.e. has
a name that is (1) fixed for a relatively long time, (2) unique, and (3) ap-
proved by a central authority. Unfortunately, the adoption of user identities
in a network does create some security holes in that network, most notably
viii
anonymity loss, identity theft, and misplaced trust. This situation raises the
following question. Is it possible to design an authentication protocol where
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Authentication protocols are becoming fixed features in the protocol stacks of com-
puter networks, the Internet, and the World Wide Web [9, 27, 50, 68, 70]. These
protocols are usually invoked by the two sides of a communication in order to allow
each side to check the “true identity,” rather than the “claimed identity,” of the
other side before the two sides start to exchange their data messages.
In this dissertation, we present the designs of five authentication protocols
that can be deployed at different layers in the protocol stacks of computer networks,
the Internet, and the World Wide Web. These five authentication protocols are
named HTTPI [21], TLP [22], TPP [20], BKP [18], and ITY [19]. Each one of these
five protocols is intended to replace an existing protocol and is designed to provide
stronger authentication guarantees than those provided by the protocol it replaces:
1. HTTPI is intended to replace HTTP [35]. And whereas HTTP does not
provide any authentication guarantees, HTTPI provides server authentication
guarantees that are similar to those provided by HTTPS [100].
2. TLP is intended to replace both TLS [27] and the standard password protocol.
However, the authentication guarantees provided by TLP are stronger than
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those provided by both TLS and the standard password protocol since TLP
(unlike TLS and the standard password protocol) can defend against Phishing
and Pharming attacks.
3. TPP is intended to replace the standard password protocol. However, the
authentication guarantees provided by TPP are stronger than those provided
by the standard password protocol since TPP (unlike the standard password
protocol) can defend against Phishing and Pharming attacks.
4. BKP is intended to replace existing keying protocols in sensor networks [3,
31, 33, 44, 74]. However, the authentication guarantees provided by BKP are
stronger than those provided by existing keying protocols because BKP (unlike
existing keying protocols) can defend against collusion attacks.
5. ITY is intended to replace existing anonymous communication protocols [15,
16,99]. However, the authentication guarantees provided by ITY are stronger
than those provided by existing anonymous communication protocols because
ITY (unlike existing anonymous communications protocols) does not assume
that users have identities.
In the remainder of this Chapter, we summarize the five authentication pro-
tocols, HTTPI, TLP, TPP, BKP, and ITY as follows.
1.1 HTTPI Protocol
HTTP and HTTPS are two well-known transport protocols in the World Wide Web.
These two protocols are two extremes in terms of costs and security guarantees.
HTTP is not expensive to use, but provides no security guarantee. On the other
hand, HTTPS is expensive to use, but provides three security guarantees of server
authentication, message integrity, and message confidentiality. The recent trends
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of technology creates a new class of web applications called “open applications.”
For example, news, social networking, and blogging require server authentication,
message integrity, and optional client authentication. However, these applications
do not require message confidentiality. Because HTTP does not support any se-
curity guarantee, HTTP is not suitable for “open application.” Because HTTPS
supports message confidentiality as well as server authentication and message in-
tegrity, HTTPS is overkill for “open application.” Therefore, we design an HTTP
with Integrity or HTTPI to support “open application.”
In order for web client C to communicate with web server S using HTTPI,
C needs to establish an HTTPI session. The established HTTPI session is uniquely
identified by two parameters: 1) session id, 2) session key. The session id is sent
in the clear in all the HTTPI requests and responses and the session key remains
private to web client C and web server S. HTTPI has the three phases of session:
1) Session Establishment, 2) Session Progression, 3) Session Termination. In the
session establishment phase, web client C and web server S use a TLS-like proto-
col to authenticate web server S to web client C and use a password protocol to
authenticate web client C to web server S. They establish their HTTPI session by
sharing the session id and agreeing on a session key corresponding to the session id.
After the HTTPI session is established, web client C can start to send HTTPI re-
quest messages to web server S and web server S can start to send HTTPI response
messages to web client C. These HTTPI messages are similar to HTTP messages
except for three header fields: 1) Session Id, 2) Header Hash, 3) Content MD5.
First, session id is shared during the session establishment and is sent in the clear
in the HTTPI header. Second, header hash is the hash value of the header fields
with the session key. Third, Content MD5 is the hash of the content body. Thus,
if the content body is not changed, the hash of the content body does not need to
be computed again. At the end of the progression phase, web server S proceeds
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to terminate the session by removing the session entry from the session table and
tearing down the connection. We call all the exchanged cookies between web client
C and web server S over HTTPI as “verifiable cookies.” A verifiable cookie is a
cookie with one additional field, called the Verifier. The Verifier is computed by
hashing the content of the cookie with both a server key and a session key. Thus,
the Verifier cannot be changed without knowing the server key and the session key.
HTTPI provides five security guarantees: 1) Authentication of server S, 2)
Integrity of Request Message from C to S, 3) Integrity of Response Message from
S to C, 4) Integrity of Cookies from C to S, 5) Integrity of Cookies from S to C.
First, authentication of server S comes from the fact that C and S use a TLS-like
protocol. Second, integrity of request message from C to S and response message
from S to C come from the fact that C and S can check whether the messages are
modified or not. The messages cannot be modified without knowing the session key,
and thus cannot be modified by other than C and S. Third, integrity of cookies
from S to C directly comes from integrity of response message from S to C. Fourth,
integrity of cookies from C to S can be done by checking the verifier of the received
cookie.
If web client C uses HTTP with web server S, C may suffer from server im-
personation, message modification, cookie theft, and cookie injection. If web client
C uses HTTPI instead with web server S, none of these attacks can succeed. Server
impersonation will not occur because HTTPI has the property of authentication of
server S. Message modification will not occur because HTTPI has the property of
integrity of request and response messages between C and S. Cookie Theft will not
occur because HTTPI has the property of integrity of C to S. Cookie Injection will
not occur because HTTPI has the property of integrity of S to C.
One may argue that HTTPS can be used instead of HTTPI. However, there
are two reasons that HTTPI is better than HTTPS. First, HTTPI is compatible
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with middle boxes such as cache proxies and application firewalls, but HTTPS is
not. Second, HTTPI outperforms HTTPS.
We implement HTTPI as a module to Apache server and experiment with
the performance with the popular three web pages, an Amazon page, a Facebook
page, and a New York Times page. We measure network throughput and CPU
execution time. The throughput of HTTPI is within 1.2 % from that of HTTP and
is about 37 % better than that of HTTPS. The CPU time of HTTPI is within 1.9 %
from that of HTTP and is about 23 % better than that of HTTPS. From these
results, we conclude that HTTPI is a reasonable design choice to support security
and performance at the same time.
1.2 TLP Protocol
Users type their sensitive data into a web page by relying on the HTTPS URL
and the yellow security indicator in the URL bar of a browser. However, users are
still vulnerable to many attacks. For example, a user attempts to call a particular
HTTPS page, but he ends up going to a wrong HTTPS page in three scenarios
caused by human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks as follows. First, a
user wants to type https://www.amazon.com, but he types https://www.anazon.
com by mistake. Second, a user receives an email having a link connecting to https:
//www.amazon.com apparently, but the user ends up going to a malicious web page
https://www.anazon.com. Third, if a web site allows a user to visit a web site
by HTTP like http://www.amazon.com, the user can be redirected to a malicious
web site https://www.anazon.com by manipulating the DNS of the user. In the
above three scenarios, the user wants to visit https://www.amazon.com, but ends
up going to http://www.anazon.com. If the two web sites have the same look and
feel, the user does not notice that he is visiting a malicious web site.
There are two ways to counter the three attack scenarios. One is to educate
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people to check the URL carefully, but it is very difficult for users to follow the
advice every time they log into every web site. The other one is to have a browser
check that the page is indeed the one that a user wants to open before it displays an
HTTPS web page. Thus, browser B loads an HTTPS page from web site S when
and only when the following three conditions hold: 1) User U has requested the
page, 2) Web site S has verified that sometime in the past user U has registered and
stored his login data 3) Browser B has verified that sometime in the past user U
has registered and stored his login data in web site S. If any of the three conditions
does not hold, the browser does not load the page.
Based on the three conditions mentioned above, we propose to modify browsers
and web sites in three parts. First, browsers need to classify each displayed HTTP
web page as white, and each displayed HTTPS web page as either yellow or brown.
A user should regard a white page as insecure, a yellow page as mildly secure, and
a brown page as highly secure. Second, our new login protocol, the Transport Lo-
gin Protocol (TLP), needs to be added to browsers and web sites. Third, browsers
assign a classification, white, yellow, or brown, to each displayed web page with the
following three rules: 1) Any HTTP page is classified by white, 2) Any HTTPS page
by TLP is classified by brown, 3) Any HTTPS page by TLS is classified by yellow if
this page is called from a white or yellow page, or brown if this page is called from
a brown page.
TLP has five features that do not exist in the current login protocols. First,
TLP is immune to attacks because user U succeeds in login iff both browser B and
web site S verify that user U has registered sometime in the past with web site
S. Second, TLP does not use external servers because all the login data are stored
in web site S. Third, TLP supports one-time login data because login data are
updated after each successful login of user U into web site S. Fourth, user U needs
to remember one password, a TLP universal password, because TLP universal pass-
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word is used to log into every web site. Fifth, TLP uses only standard cryptography
like AES and SHA-1.
TLP achieves the five objectives: 1) Browser B checks that web site S is one
of the web sites where user U has registered, 2) Web site S checks that user U enters
his universal password, 3) Both browser B and web site S agree on a session key, 4)
Browser B selects a new nonce n′ and stores the login data in web site S, 5) Web
site S sends to browser B the next HTTPS page that browser B needs to visit.
In order to achieve the five objectives, TLP implements the four messages.
Initially, user U needs to store a login data with shared secrets. First, browser B
sends a hello message to web site S with a user’s identity U . Web site S fetches
the login data of user U with the user’s identity. Second, web site S replies with a
hello-reply message with a nonce and the server nonce encrypted with the current
shared secret. Browser B learns the server nonce by decryption. Third, browser B
sends a login message with a user’s identity U , the password for the current login, a
browser nonce, and new login data encrypted with a shared secret and a session key.
When web site S receives the login message, web site S checks that user U enters its
TLP universal password, extracts the browser nonce, and stores a new login data.
Finally, web site S replies with a login-reply message with a next HTTPS URL and
a cookie encrypted with the session key. Browser B knows that web site S is one of
the web sites where user U has registered before.
TLP defends against user impersonation, human mistakes, Phishing and
Pharming attacks, and eavesdropping because an attacker will not be able to com-
pute shared secrets needed to log into web site S.
1.3 TPP Protocol
Current online authentication involves a combination of two protocols: Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and a simple password protocol, which we have named the
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One-Way Password Protocol (OPP). TLS achieves two outcomes: 1) Client C knows
that it is indeed communicating with web site S, 2) Both C and S agree on a master
secret that they can use to encrypt and decrypt all the messages that they need to
exchange next. As a result, the authentication by TLS is not symmetric and web
site S does not know the client with whom it is communicating. Thus, TLS is paired
with OPP to authenticate client C to web site S. However, this combination does
not defend against many attacks like Phishing attacks.
The combination of TLS and OPP has one subtle weakness: authenticating
web site S to a user’s browser is not the same as authenticating web site S to user
U . In order to leverage the weakness, an adversary only needs to make users believe
that malicious web server M is associated with web server S by having M show
the same graphics and images of S. Essentially, this is how Phishing attacks work.
Although web site M is not related to web site S, it is hard for user U to distinguish
web site M from web site S. Therefore, we need a way to show that these two web
sites belong to two different domains.
The standard practice of OPP and TLS is broken by Phishing attacks because
web site S is not properly authenticated to user U . In other words, user U knows
that he is communicating with web site M , but has no way of knowing whether or not
web site M is associated with web site S with which user U has a relationship before.
So we could make the password protocol symmetric: web site S is authenticated to
user U by knowledge of a secret called the server password. In fact, this Server
Password Protocol (SPP) is usually called the Site-Key Protocol and a site key can
be a unique image or a phrase. The usual mechanism is for user U to store the
server password on web site S and web site S is authenticated to user U by sending
the server password. However, this attractive solution cannot solve Phishing attacks
as it is still vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
Considering the fact that an adversary can steal passwords from user U using
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Phishing attacks, we can think of a way to ensure that the password of user U on
web site S cannot be stolen. The Universal Password Protocol (UPP) prevents
the password from being stolen by an attacker. User U only has to remember one
universal password and the password is computed by hashing the universal password
and the domain name of web site S. User U stores the hash of the password in
registration with web site S. Even if web site S is compromised, an attacker cannot
use the hash of the password to impersonate user U . When a Phishing attack
occurs by a malicious server M , user U uses the domain name of M to compute the
password for web site M . As a result, M cannot learn the password of user U on
web site S. Although this protocol can protect the password of user U on S, UPP
does not protect the other credentials like credit card numbers. Thus, this protocol
still has the same weakness as SPP.
We address the vulnerability of UPP to develop the Two-Way Password
Protocol (TPP). Unlike UPP, TPP ensures that the server password of web site
S binds to the domain name. TPP uses the same password like UPP and the
password is the hash value of the universal password and the domain name of web
site S. However, TPP uses the hash of the password as a server password. Now
when a Man-In-The-Middle attack occurs, a malicious web site M needs to compute
the hash of the password, but it cannot be computed without knowing the universal
password. Thus, TPP ensures that the server password cannot be just passed by
the Man-In-The-Middle and the other credentials cannot be stolen, either.
Although TPP achieves the goal of protecting users from Phishing attacks,
TPP does not have the feature of one-time login data. We could think of the case
where the password is leaked in practice. In such a case, we want to minimize the
damage by incorporating one-time login data into TPP: the secrets are updated on
each login. Even if an adversary steals the password of U , the stolen password is
only useful until the next time user U logs into web site S. We call this protocol
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the Dynamic Two-way Password Protocol (DTPP).
TPP defends against Phishing attacks by introducing the hash of password as
a server password and TPP binds the communication from web server S to browser
B. The password for TPP is the same as the password for UPP and the password is
the hash of a domain name and a universal password. Thus, the universal password
cannot be stolen by an attacker.
1.4 BKP Protocol
Many wireless sensor networks are deployed randomly and any sensor can end up
being with any other sensor. In this environment, any sensor z who attempts to
disrupt the communication between sensor x and sensor y is an adversary and sensor
z can launch two attacks: 1) impersonation attack, 2) eavesdropping attack. To
defend against these attacks, sensor x and sensor y are required to share the secret
known only to sensor x and y, but not other sensors.
A keying protocol for a sensor network is to assign a unique symmetric key
to each pair of distinct sensors x and y in the network. Each symmetric key is
assigned by the keying protocol before the sensor network is deployed. In a trivial
approach, every sensor is required to store n − 1 symmetric keys if there are n
sensors. However, this trivial approach is not efficient because it requires the huge
number of keys (O(n2)) needs to be stored as n grows.
There are two ways for a senor to know a symmetric key: 1) storage, 2)
computation. The cost of a keying protocol for a sensor network is measured by the
number of keys that need to be stored in the sensor network. Thus, it is important
to reduce the number of keys stored in the sensor network.
Suppose that the number of sensors in our sensor network is n where n is
an odd positive integer, without loss of generality. Each sensor is assigned a unique
identifier in the range 0 . . . n− 1. In this network, each pair of two sensors x and y
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shares a key to perform two functions: 1) mutual authentication, 2) confidential data
exchange. If the shared symmetric keys are designed to have a “special structure,”
then each sensor needs to store only (n + 1)/2 shared symmetric keys. For the
“special structure,” we define two new concepts: 1) universal keys, 2) asymmetric
relation, named below. Each sensor x stores a symmetric key, called the universal key
of sensor x. Sensors x and y have identifiers ix and iy, respectively and identifier
ix is said to be below identifier iy iff exactly one of the following two conditions
holds: 1) ix < iy and (iy − ix) < n/2, 2) ix > iy and (ix− iy) > n/2. The special
structure of the symmetric key is the hash of identifier ix and the universal key uy
where ix is below iy. In this case, the symmetric key needs to be stored in sensor x
and sensor y can compute it whenever sensor y wants to use it. Thus, each sensor
x stores one universal key and (n − 1)/2 symmetric keys for every sensor y where
ix is below iy and the number of keys stored in sensor x becomes (n + 1)/2.
Now if two sensors x and y happen to be adjacent with each other, then they
need to execute a mutual authentication protocol to communicate securely with
each other. Sensor x selects a random nonce nx and sends a hello message with
nx and its identifier ix and sensor y selects a random nonce ny and sends a hello
message with ny and its identifier iy. Sensor x and sensor y determine whether
their identifiers are below or not. If its identifier is below, it gets the shared key
from the storage. Otherwise, it computes the shared key. Finally, sensor x sends a
verify message by hashing its identifier ix, the counterpart’s identifier iy, and the
received nonce ny with the shared key. Similarly, sensor y sends a verify message to
sensor x. This mutual authentication protocol defends against impersonation and
Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
After two sensors authenticate to each other by the mutual authentication
protocol, they can start exchanging data messages using the data exchange protocol
as follows. Sensor x sends its identifier ix, the counterpart’s identifier iy, and the
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encryption of nonce ny and the text of the data message. Similarly, sensor y sends
the data to sensor x. This data exchange protocol defends against eavesdropping
and replay attacks.
With our keying protocol, every sensor in the sensor network is required to
store only (n + 1)/2 keys and the total number of keys to be stored in the sensor
network is n(n+1)/2. This is much better than the trivial approach to store n(n−1)
keys. One can ask whether there exists a better algorithm to store much less keys
than n(n + 1)/2 keys. Theoretically, each keying protocol, that is collusion-proof,
requires the sensor network to store at least n(n − 1)/2 keys. Thus, our keying
protocol is optimal in terms of the number of keys and thus called the Best Keying
Protocol (BKP).
There are two problems with our keying protocol: 1) The number of sym-
metric keys, n(n+ 1)/2, is still large if n is large, 2) If a sensor network is deployed
and if later the number of sensors is increased beyond the upper bound n, the stored
keys must be changed. To solve these problems, we introduce the concept of a “sen-
sor role” as follows. Each sensor in a sensor network has a role and the role of a
sensor describes the task of the sensor. Many sensors in a sensor network can have
the same role to provide fault-tolerance. Thus, the number of roles, m, is relatively
small and it is easy to add any sensor to existing roles and to add a new role in a
sensor network.
Our BKP successfully reduces the number of keys needs to be stored in the
sensor network by using the special structure of having one universal key and an
asymmetric relation called below. Our BKP is not only efficient but also secure
against collusion attacks compared to most efficient keying protocols.
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1.5 ITY Protocol
Most networks are designed assuming that every user is assigned an identity, which
satisfies three conditions: 1) Fixed 2) Unique 3) Approved by a Central Authority.
This identity plays an important role in a network in three ways: a) User Identifica-
tion b) User Authentication c) User Reputation. Although this adoption facilitates
the execution of a network, it also incurs some security problems like anonymity
loss, identity theft, and misplaced trust. There are two approaches to remedy these
security holes. One is to defend against each one of these holes; another is to take a
completely different approach to design a network without identities. We take the
latter just because no one attempted this approach before.
We design a network without identities by replacing identities with an address
and a nonempty set of pseudonyms. The pair, an address and a nonempty set
of pseudonyms, satisfies three conditions: 1) Not Necessarily Fixed 2) Unique 3)
Approved by a Central Authority. Interestingly, the first condition is the opposite of
that of an identity. This means that an address and a nonempty set of pseudonyms
cannot be used for an identity. Based on this observation, we design the three
protocols: 1) registration protocol 2) connection protocol 3) authentication protocol.
The registration protocol allows each user x in the network to register its
current address and its current pseudonym set periodically. Every user is required
to send a registration message to the network every T seconds. The registration
message consists of an address, a nonempty set of pseudonyms, a registration key, a
timestamp, and the message signature signed by the private key corresponding to the
registration key. When the network receives the registration message, it first checks
the timestamp and then the signature. If the timestamp is not “close” to the real
time or the signature is not correct, the network discards the registration message.
If the network does not find the address that matches the received address in the
registration table, then the network adds the tuple of the address, the nonempty set
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of pseudonyms, the registration key, and the timestamp. Otherwise, the network
updates the address in the existing tuple. The network checks the registration table
and discards every tuple that has not been updated for more than 2T seconds. There
are three cases for the registration table not to be updated: 1) User x has failed or
has quit the network 2) User x has changed its address 3) User x has changed its
registration key. In all the three cases, the tuples of the registration table need to
be removed.
The connection protocol allows two users in the network to become connected
to one another. This implies that each user knows the current address of the other
user and the two users share a symmetric key. The connection protocol consists of
three messages: a request message from any user to the network requesting to be
connected to another user and two reply messages from the network to the two users
notifying that they are connected. When user x wants to establish a connection with
another user y, user x sends a request message to the network. When the network
receives the request message from user x, it checks the timestamp and the address. If
the timestamp is not “close” to the real time or the network does not find any tuple
having the same address, then the network discards the message and terminates the
protocol. If the network finds two distinct tuples for user x and user y and their
pseudonyms are contained in the nonempty pseudonym sets of user x and user y,
the network generates a symmetric connection key and sends a reply message to
user x and user y by encrypting the symmetric connection key with the registration
key of user x and user y, respectively.
After initiating the connection protocol, user x and user y obtain the current
address of the other user and a copy of the symmetric connection key. After user x
and user y establish the connection and before they start exchanging data messages
over the established connection, user x and user y need to execute the authentication
protocol. If the connection is not the first one between user x and user y, they will
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have agreed on four items in their last established connection: 1) a pseudonym for
user x 2) a pseudonym for user y 3) a token for user x 4) a token for user y. These
items are stored as a tuple in the authentication table of user x and user y. In order
for user x to be authenticated by user y, user x sends the stored token from the
authentication table by encrypting with the connection key to the current address
of user y. When user y receives the token encrypted with the connection key from
user x, user y decrypts the received token and compares with the stored token in
the authentication table of user y. If they are matched, user y authenticates user x
and user y sends user x the stored token from the authentication table of user y by
encrypting with the connection key. Otherwise, user y sends user x a random value
as a token. When user x receives the encrypted token from user y, user x compares
the received token with the stored token. If they are matched, user x authenticates
user y. After user x and user y receive the tokens from each other, they send a new
pseudonym and a new token by encrypting with the connection key. If user y or
user x is authenticated, user x or user y removes the existing tuple, respectively. In
any case, user x and user y insert a new tuple with the new pseudonym and the new
token into their authentication table.
These three protocols (registration, connection, and authentication proto-
col) are designed to defend against many attacks including pseudonym theft, ad-
dress theft, wrong address, message forging, replay, impersonation, and man-in-the-
middle attack. Therefore, we design a network without identities and defend against
anonymity loss, identity theft, and misplaced trust.
1.6 Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present our design of the
HTTPI protocol, which defends against attacks that cannot be defended against
by HTTP. In Chapter 3, we present our design of the Transport Login Protocol
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(TLP), which defends against Phishing and Pharming attacks. In Chapter 4, we
present our design of the Two-Way Password Protocol (TPP), that also defends
against Phishing and Pharming attacks. In Chapter 5, we present our design of the
Best Keying Protocol (BKP), that can be used over computationally constrained
networks like sensor networks. In Chapter 6, we present our design of the ITY
protocol, that provides authentication in networks where users have no identities.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes our dissertation and discusses future research.
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Chapter 2
HTTPI: An HTTP with
Integrity
The World Wide Web famously supports two transport protocols: HTTP and
HTTPS. These two protocols are at the opposite ends of three dimensions: se-
curity guarantees, cost of use, and compatibility with middle boxes (e.g. cache
proxies) in the Internet. At one end, HTTP provides no security guarantees, but
it is inexpensive to use, and is compatible with middle boxes in the Internet. At
the other end, HTTPS provides three security guarantees, but it is expensive to use
and is not compatible with middle boxes. Although the three security guarantees
provided by HTTPS, namely server authentication, message integrity, and message
confidentiality, are important in general, many web servers (e.g. email servers) do
not need the message confidentiality guarantee. In this Chapter, we present a new
transport protocol for the Web, named HTTPI. This protocol provides both server
authentication and message integrity, but not message confidentiality. Like HTTP,
HTTPI is inexpensive to use and is compatible with middle boxes, and like HTTPS,
it defends against many cyber attacks (e.g. Pharming attacks) that HTTP cannot
defend against. We developed a preliminary implementation of HTTPI and showed
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Table 2.1: Security guarantees of HTTP, HTTPS, HTTPA, HTTPI
Server
Auth
Client Auth Integrity Confiden-
tiality
HTTP
HTTPS X X X
HTTPS with Password X X X X
HTTPA X X
HTTPI X X
HTTPI with Password X X X
through experimentation that the throughput of HTTPI is within 1.2% from that
of HTTP and is 37% better than that of HTTPS. HTTPI was published in [21].
In most cases, HTTPS is also augmented with a password protocol in order
to provide the added guarantee of client authentication. (Note that HTTP cannot
be easily augmented with a password protocol to provide client authentication.)
A third transport protocol for the web, namely HTTP Authentication or
HTTPA for short, has also been proposed [37]. The cost of using HTTPA is some-
where in the middle between the two costs of using HTTP and of using HTTPS.
HTTPA provides only two security guarantees: client authentication and message
integrity [37].
Therefore, depending on the security requirements of some web application,
the application designers can choose to deploy their application on top of HTTP,
HTTPS, or HTTPA. For example, the designers of some search engine, which re-
quires no security, can deploy their engine on top of HTTP. On the other hand, the
designers of some on-line banking application, which requires maximal security, can
deploy their application on top of HTTPS after it is augmented with a password
protocol.
Recently, however, a new class of web applications, which we refer to as
“open applications,” has emerged. And it turns out that the security requirements
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of open applications do not quite match the security guarantees provided by HTTP,
HTTPS, or HTTPA. Examples of these open applications are web email, social
networking, and web blogging. The security requirements of these open applications
are (1) server authentication, (2) message integrity, and in some cases (3) client
authentication. These open applications, however, do not usually require message
confidentiality.
Because neither HTTP nor HTTPA provides all the security requirements
of open applications, these applications cannot be deployed on top of HTTP or
HTTPA. Also, because open applications do not usually require the expensive re-
quirement of message confidentiality, which is provided by HTTPS, deploying these
applications on top of HTTPS is both an expensive and overkill proposition. More-
over, as explained below, because HTTPS is not compatible with middle boxes (such
as cache proxies) in the Internet, deploying open applications on top of HTTPS pre-
vents these applications from taking advantage of the middle boxes in the Internet.
Thus, in order to support the secure and efficient deployment of open ap-
plications in the web, we present in this Chapter a new transport protocol for the
web, which we refer to as HTTP Integrity or HTTPI for short. HTTPI provides
the two security guarantees of server authentication and message integrity. But it
does not provide message confidentiality. Moreover, HTTPI can be augmented by a
password protocol in order to provide the added guarantee of client authentication.
For convenience, Table 2.1 lists the security guarantees that are provided by
each member of the HTTP family of protocols. Because the security requirements
of open applications are server authentication, message integrity, and in some cases
client authentication, it is clear from Table 2.1 that these applications are better
deployed on top of HTTPI (with or without password protocol).
The rest of this Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.1, we introduce
the two main features of HTTPI, namely HTTPI sessions and verifiable cookies. In
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Figure 2.1: Progression Phase in HTTPI
Section 2.2, we formally present the security guarantees provided by HTTPI and
discuss how HTTPI provides these guarantees. Then in Section 2.3, we discuss some
well-known cyber attacks that HTTPI can defend against but HTTP cannot. And
in Section 2.5, we argue that HTTPI is compatible with middle boxes (such as cache
proxies and application firewalls) in the Internet but HTTPS is not. In Section 2.6 we
present some experimental results that compare the performance of HTTPI against
those of HTTP and HTTPS. These results suggest that the throughput of HTTPI
is within 1.2% of that of HTTP and is 37% better than that of HTTPS. Finally,
we end the Chapter by discussing related work in Section 2.7 and offering some
concluding remarks in Section 2.8.
2.1 Design of HTTPI
In order for a web client C (i.e. a browser) to communicate with a web server S
using HTTPI, C needs first to establish an HTTPI session with S. The established
session is uniquely identified by two parameters:
1. A session id that is computed by S and communicated to C during the session
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establishment phase
2. A session (symmetric) key that is computed by both C and S during the session
establishment phase
The session id will be sent in the clear in all the HTTPI request and response
messages that are exchanged between C and S in the established HTTPI session.
The session key will remain private, known only to C and S.
The HTTPI session is established over a TCP connection between a high-
numbered TCP port in C and the TCP port 80 in S.
In this Section, we describe the three phases of an HTTPI session between C
and S: establishment, progression, and termination. Then, we describe the verifiable
cookies which can be exchanged in each such session.
2.1.1 Session Establishment
The web client C and the web server S use a TLS-like protocol to establish their
HTTPI session. This protocol allows C and S to perform three tasks.
i. The web client C becomes certain that it is indeed communicating with the
right web server S. (Moreover, if a password protocol is added to the TLS-like
protocol, then S also can become certain that it is indeed communicating with
the right web client C.)
ii. The web server S chooses a unique id for the session and communicates it to
C. Server S also chooses a future expiration time for the session.
iii. Both C and S agree on a symmetric session key known only to C and S.
At the end of the session establishment phase, the web client C associates the fol-
lowing session entry with its TCP port for this session:
21
(Session Id, Session Key, IP address of S, Session Cookies)
The last field “Session Cookies” in this entry is a pointer to all the cookies that are
accumulated in C during this session. (See Section 2.1.4 below.) Also at the end of
the session establishment phase, the web server S adds the following session entry
to its session table:
(Session Id, Session Key, IP address of C, TCP port number in C, Session Expira-
tion Time)
2.1.2 Session Progression
Once an HTTPI session between C and S is established, C can start to send HTTPI
request messages to S and receive HTTPI response messages from S. Each HTTPI
message, whether a request or response, is similar to an HTTP message with three
exceptions:
a. The header of each HTTPI message has a new field, called Session Id, whose
value is the id of the session in which this message is sent.
b. The header of each HTTPI message has another new field, called Header Hash.
The value of this field is the result of applying the secure hash function SHA-1
on the concatenation of the session key and all the immutable fields in the
message header [73].
c. If an HTTPI message has some “content,” then the header of the message has
the field Content-MD5 [86]. The value of this field is the result of applying the
secure hash function MD5 to message content. (Note that this field is optional
22
in HTTP, but mandatory in HTTPI when the message has some content.)
An illustration of the message exchange between client C and web server S during
the session progression phase is shown in Figure 2.1. If HTTPI request is GET
request compared to POST request in Figure 2.1, the GET request does not have
POST Data and does not need to have H(POST Data) in Header.
The progression phase of an HTTPI connection between client C and server
S can last for a long time, for example days or weeks, even if C stops sending
HTTPI requests to S. This is in complete contrast with HTTPS connections whose
progression phase is usually short, lasting only for minutes, and requires that S
continuously sends HTTPS request messages to S. This difference between HTTPI
and HTTPS is due to the fact that HTTPI, unlike HTTPS, does not provide any
confidentiality guarantees that can be threatened during the long progression phase
even when client C leaves the established connection unattended.
2.1.3 Session Termination
At the end of the progression phase of an established HTTPI connection between
client C and server S, server S proceeds to terminate the established session. It is
also possible that server S may decide to terminate the oldest established HTTPI
session in its session table, before the expiration time of this connection, when S
notices that the session table has become full or near full.
Server S terminates an established HTTPI session with client C by simply
removing the session entry from the session table (in S) and by tearing down the
TCP connection, between C and S, over which this HTTPI session was established.
Later, if C sends to S a request message in this HTTPI session, C will receive back
a TCP reset message informing it that the TCP connection between C and S has
been torn down. This will cause C to tear down the TCP connection and remove
the session entry associated with its TCP port.
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2.1.4 Verifiable Cookies
All the exchanged cookies between a web client C and a web server S in an established
HTTPI session are “verifiable cookies.” A verifiable cookie is an ordinary cookie with
one additional field, called the Verifier. The value of this Verifier field is computed
by S as follows:
Verifier := H(Server Key, Session Key, Cookie)
where H is a secure hash function, say SHA-1, applied to the concatenation of three
components:
1. Server Key: is a symmetric key that is known only to server S.
2. Session Key: is the session key for the established HTTPI session in which
this verifiable cookie is to be sent.
3. Cookie: is the content of the cookie to which this verifier is to be attached.
When server S receives a verifiable cookie (part of an HTTPI request mes-
sage) that is supposedly sent in some established HTTPI session, then server S
examines the verifier field in the cookie and verifies:
a. whether S itself has generated this cookie earlier (since the verifier field is
computed using the server key of S, which is known only to S) and
b. whether S itself has sent this cookie earlier in the established HTTPI session
(since the verifier field is computed using the session key of the established
session)
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2.2 Security Guarantees of HTTPI
Our design of HTTPI, which is outlined in the previous Section, provides five security
guarantees in the HTTPI communication between a client C and a server S. These
five guarantees are as follows:
1. Authentication of server S
2. Integrity of Request Messages from C to S
3. Integrity of Response Messages from S to C
4. Integrity of Cookies from C to S
5. Integrity of Cookies from S to C
In the next five Subsections, we formally state these five guarantees and
explain how HTTPI provides them. (Then in the next Section, we discuss how
these security guarantees allow HTTPI to defend against some well known cyber
attacks.)
2.2.1 Authentication of server S
This security guarantee can be stated as follows:
If the web client C succeeds in establishing an HTTPI session with some web
server claiming to be S, then C is certain that the established HTTPI session
is indeed between itself and the web server S.
During the HTTPI session establishment phase, client C and the server execute the
following steps (which are part of the TLS-like protocol). First, C receives from the
server a signed certificate that has the public key BK of server S. Second, C selects
at random part of the HTTPI session key, encrypts the resulting HTTPI session
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key SK using BK, and sends the encrypted session key to the server. Third, if the
server is indeed server S, then it has the private key of S and can use it to obtain the
session key SK from the encrypted session key it has received from C. Fourth, when
the server demonstrates to client C that it has succeeded in obtaining the session
key SK, client C recognizes that the server is indeed S, and the session establishment
phase concludes successfully with both C and S having the same session key SK.
2.2.2 Integrity of Request Messages from C to S
This security guarantee can be stated as follows:
If the web server S receives an HTTPI request message that is supposedly sent
(by some unknown web client) in some established HTTPI session, then S can
check whether this message was indeed sent in the established session.
Assume that server S receives an HTTPI request message that is supposedly sent in
some established HTTPI session. As S knows the session key SK of the established
session, S uses SK to compute the Header Hash of the message. Then, S concludes
that the message was indeed sent in the established session iff the computed Header
Hash equals the Header Hash field in the header of the received message.
2.2.3 Integrity of response messages from S to C
This security guarantee can be stated as follows:
If the web client C receives an HTTPI response message that is supposedly
sent by some web server S in some established HTTPI session, then C can
check whether this message was indeed sent by S in the established session.
Assume that client C receives an HTTPI response message that is supposedly sent in
some established HTTPI session. As C knows the session key SK of the established
26
session, C uses SK to compute the Header Hash of the message. Then, C concludes
that the message was indeed sent in the established session iff the computed Header
Hash equals the Header Hash field in the header of the received message.
2.2.4 Integrity of Cookies from C to S
This security guarantee can be stated as follows:
If the web server S receives a verified cookie that is supposedly generated and
sent earlier by S in some established HTTPI session, then S can check whether
this cookie was indeed generated and sent earlier by S in the established ses-
sion.
Assume that server S receives a verified cookie that is supposedly generated and
sent earlier by S in some established HTTPI session. As S knows its own server key
RK and the session key SK of the established session, S uses both RK and SK to
compute the Verifier of the cookie. Then, S concludes that the cookie was indeed
generated and sent earlier by S in the established session iff the computed Verifier
equals the Verifier field in the received cookie.
2.2.5 Integrity of Cookies from S to C
This security guarantee can be stated as follows:
If the web client C receives a verified cookie that is supposedly sent by the
web server S in some established HTTPI session, then C can check whether
this cookie was indeed sent by S in the established session.
Assume that client C receives a verified cookie, in the header of an HTTPI response
message, that is supposedly sent in some established HTTPI session. From the
security guarantee in Section 2.2.3, namely the integrity of response messages from
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Table 2.2: Cyber Attacks that HTTPI can defend against
Cyber Attacks Examples of Attacks Security Guarantees to
Defend Against Attacks
Server Impersonation Drive-By Pharming [96,97,111], Server Authentication
DNS rebinding [60],
DNS cache poisoning [115]
Message Modification In-flight Page Change [98], Message Integrity from
C to S,
ARP poisoning [124,126] Message Integrity from
S to C
Cookie Theft Side Jacking [46], Surf Jacking [43] Cookie Integrity from
C to S
Cookie Injection Session Fixation [72] Cookie Integrity from
S to C
S to C, C can check whether this message, including the verified cookie in its header,
was indeed sent in the established session.
2.3 Defending against Cyber Attacks
If a web client C uses HTTP to communicate with a web server S, then the com-






In this Section, we discuss these four attacks in some detail. We then argue
that if client C uses HTTPI (instead of HTTP) to communicate with server S then
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none of these attacks can succeed in interfering with or disrupting the communica-
tion between C and S.
2.3.1 Server Impersonation
Before a client C can use HTTP to communicate with a server S, C needs first to
get the IP address of S. Client C can obtain the IP address of S either from the
DNS cache of C itself or through the default DNS server of C. Unfortunately, C may
end up obtaining a wrong IP address (rather than the correct IP address of S) as a
result of one of the following attacks:
a. DNS Rebinding [60]: This attack corrupts the data stored in the DNS cache
of C.
b. DNS Cache Poisoning [115]: This attack corrupts the data stored in the default
DNS server of C.
c. Drive-by Pharming [96, 97, 111]: This attack changes the default DNS server
of C, from a legitimate DNS server to an adversarial DNS server, without C’s
knowledge.
When this happens, client C starts to communicate with a different (possibly ad-
versarial) server S’ thinking that it is communicating with the intended server S. In
effect, the server impersonation attack has succeeded.
Now consider the case where client C uses HTTPI, instead of HTTP, to
communicate with server S. Assume that C ends up with a wrong IP address, that
belongs to a server S’ different from the intended server S. In this case, execution
of the TLS protocol between C and S’, in the establishment phase of the HTTPI
session, will fail. And so the server impersonation attack will not succeed.
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2.3.2 Message Modification
If a client C uses HTTP to communicate with a server S, then any computer that
is located on the communication path between C and S can modify the exchanged
messages between C and S. (Sometimes it is also possible for a computer, that is not
on the communication path between C and S, to use ARP poisoning [124,126] and
add itself on the communication path between C and S, and so be able to modify
the exchanged messages between C and S.)
There are strong motives for a computer to modify the exchanged messages
between a client C and a server S. For example, if this computer belongs to an ISP,
then this computer may attempt to insert some advertisements in the web pages
that are sent from S to C. On the other hand, if this computer is a proxy of client
C, then this computer may attempt to remove all the advertisements from a web
page that is sent by S before forwarding the web page to C.
Now consider the case where C uses HTTPI, instead of HTTP, to commu-
nicate with S. In this case, if any computer on the communication path between C
and S modifies any message that is sent between C and S, then the header hash field
and the content-MD5 field in this message will no longer be consistent with the rest
of the message and the message ends up being discarded before it is delivered. (Note
that the computer, that modified the message, cannot modify the header hash field
and the content-MD5 field in the message to make them consistent with the rest of
the message. This is because this computer does not know the session key for the
current HTTPI session between C and S.)
2.3.3 Cookie Theft
If a client C uses HTTP to communicate with a server S, then all the exchanged
cookies in the communication between C and S are sent in the clear (i.e. un-
encrypted). Thus, any computer C’, that is located on the communication path
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between C and S, can copy all the cookies that occur in the request messages from
C to S and later use these copied cookies to communicate with S pretending to be
C. Examples of this attack are Side Jacking [46] and Surf Jacking [43].
Now consider the case where C uses HTTPI, instead of HTTP, to commu-
nicate with S. In this case, all the (verifiable) cookies, that are exchanged in the
established HTTPI session between C and S, are sent in the clear. Assume that
a computer C’, located on the communication path between C and S, copies all
cookies that occur in the request messages from C to S. (Recall that each one of
these cookies has a verifier field whose value is computed as follows:
Verifier := H(Server Key, Session Key, Cookie)
where the session key is the key of the established HTTPI session between C and S.)
Now if computer C’ later establishes an HTTPI session with server S and pretends
to be C by using any of the cookies that it has copied from the former HTTPI
session in the later HTTPI session, then the verifier field of this cookie will not be
consistent with the session key of the current HTTPI session between C’ and S and
the cookie will be rejected. (This is because the session key of the later HTTPI
session between C’ and S is different from the session key of the former HTTPI
session between C and S.) In other words, cookies that are stolen from one HTTPI
session cannot be used in a later HTTPI session and the cookie theft attack will fail.
2.3.4 Cookie Injection
If a client C uses HTTP to communicate with a server S but ends up, due to some
server impersonation attack (similar to those described in Section 2.3.1), communi-
cating with an adversarial server S’, rather than S, then S’ can send to C erroneous
cookies proclaiming that they were sent from server S to client C’, rather than C.
Unwittingly, client C stores the received erroneous cookies in its cookie jar. Later
when client C sends an HTTP request to the true server S, the erroneous cookies
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are sent with the request identifying the client to be C’, rather than C, and client C
is subjected to a cookie injection attack. Examples of cookie injection attacks are
reported in [62] and [72].
Note that each cookie injection attack starts with a successful server imper-
sonation attack. But HTTPI can defend against server impersonation attacks, as
discussed in Section 2.3.1. Thus, if a client C uses HTTPI to communicate with a
server S, then client C cannot be subjected to any cookie injection attack.
For convenience, Table 2.2 lists the cyber attacks that HTTPI can defend
against and the security guarantees of HTTPI that can be used to defend against
these attacks.
2.3.5 Attacks that HTTPI Cannot Defend Against
HTTPI cannot defend against two types of cyber attacks:
1. Eavesdropping attacks:
Because HTTPI does not provide confidentiality, it cannot defend against
eavesdropping attacks. On the other hand, HTTPI is not intended (by design)
to provide confidentiality. Thus, applications that value confidentiality should
use HTTPS rather than HTTPI.
2. Attacks that HTTPS cannot defend against :
The security guarantees provided by HTTPI is a proper subset of those pro-
vided by HTTPS. Thus, attacks that HTTPS cannot defend against, such as




We explain implementation details of HTTPI in this Section. Hashing header fields
and contents seems trivial, but the devils are in detail.
2.4.1 Content Hashing
The Content-MD5 header field is defined as the MD5 hash of an entity-body [86] as
follows:
Content-MD5 := H(entity-body)
An entity-body is any content-type data applied with some encoding such as
compression [35] as follows:
entity-body := Content-Encoding(Content-Type(data))
If transfer-coding is applied, it becomes a message-body used to carry the
entity-body associated with an HTTP request or response [35]. The Content-MD5
header field should be applied to a content after some content encoding, but before
some transfer encoding. This definition does not address instance manipulations
like range-selection or delta encoding and the concept of instance [84] is introduced.
Precisely, the Content-MD5 header field should be applied to a content after some
content encoding and before some instance manipulations or some transfer encoding.
More precisely, if we consider dynamic contents by server-side scripts, the Content-
MD5 header field should be applied to a content after some content encoding and
the execution of server-side scripts, and before some instance manipulations or some
transfer encoding. Currently, Apache 2.2.11 computes Content-MD5 for static con-
tents and we implemented the filter to compute the Content-MD5 header field for
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dynamic contents.
2.4.2 Decoupling Header and Contents
Our first design of HTTPI applies keyed-hashing to entity-header fields and an
entity-body together. However, it becomes clear shortly that header fields and
content should be decoupled for hashing due to the following two reasons. First, it
is inflexible since it still cannot support caching even without encryption, and it has
no difference from using TLS without encryption. In fact, TLS supports a null cipher
feature such as TLS RSA WITH NULL SHA or TLS RSA WITH NULL MD5 [27]
though they are not used in practice. Second, it is inefficient since it hurts the
pipelining of a web server. The web server can generate the HMAC header field of
an instance after reading the instance completely.
Our second design of HTTPI separates header fields from an instance and we
use the Content-MD5 header field [86] for contents hashing and keyed-hash header
fields with the Content-MD5 header field. It is advantageous in many ways com-
pared to our initial design of HTTPI. First, it is flexible to support caching since
the value of contents hashing does not change unless the contents change. Contents
hashing can be cached or precomputed if a webpage is static. If the Content-MD5
header field is computed for a static content initially, the Content-MD5 header field
can be used for other users. Dynamic webpages can be made possible with two tech-
nologies such as client-side scripts and server-side scripts. Since client-side scripts
are executed in a browser, the contents hashing needs to consider only server-side
scripts for a dynamic webpage. A webpage consists of many web objects including
images, stylesheets, and scripts. Contents hashing can be precomputed and cached
for images and stylesheets always. Client-side scripts can also be precomputed and
cached. Header fields contain more specific information including date, cookies and
sometimes authentication. Thus, contents are most likely user-independent and
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header fields are user-dependent, and it is reasonable to separate header fields and
contents from an instance for hashing. In addition to that, if the Content-MD5
header field is replaced by the Content-SHA1 header field, which does not exist cur-
rently, in the future due to the weakness of MD5, the logic of HTTPI need not be
changed. Second, it does not impact the pipelining of a web server since it only re-
quires to compute the HMAC of header fields and add the HMAC header field as the
last header field on the fly instead of waiting for the computation of keyed-hashing
of contents as in our first design.
2.4.3 Our New Header Fields
We design two header fields for HTTPI: 1) HMAC, 2) HMAC-control. We illustrate
the HMAC and the HMAC-control header field as follows, respectively. We follow
the definitions of Augmented BNF in [35]. Method, Request-URI, and Status-Code
of HMAC-control follows the definitions in [35]. The HMAC header field contains
the session-id value, the hashing algorithm such as md5 or sha1 and the hash value
of header fields with the session key, SK.
HMAC: session-id=quoted-string, alg= md5 | sha1, hash=H(SK,1#header-field)




An HTTP request consists of the request-line, the request header, and the
body. Similarly, An HTTP response consists of the status-line, the response header,
and the body. The request-line and the status-line can be changed by proxies and
should not be used for keyed-hashing directly. Moreover, the request-line and the
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status-line processing must be tolerant in a web server and a browser since they can
contain extra spaces and tabs [35]. However, the values used by an origin server
should be kept since these values can be modified for attacks. The request-line
consists of the method, the request-uri, and the http-version, and the status-line
consists of the http-version, the status-code, and the reason-phrase. Thus, we add
the method, the request-uri, the http-version, and the status-code in the HMAC-
control header field. Additionally, we create the must-include and the must-exclude
header fields for the HMAC-control header field. If a 304 (Not Modified) response
is used by an origin web server, the cache may include more header fields other
than the header fields received by the origin web server. In this case, the origin
web server can enumerate all the header fields to compute the HMAC in the must-
include header field when an HTTP response is received by a browser. If an origin
web server is clockless, the origin web server does not generate the Date header field,
and proxies may add the Date header field to the header. In this case, the origin
web server can use the must-exclude header field to note that the origin web server
does not generate the Date header field.
2.4.4 Caching in HTTPI
In order to support the caching mechanism in HTTP, HTTPI is required to keyed-
hash header fields selectively. There are two kinds of header fields depending on
the behavior of caching: end-to-end header fields and hop-by-hop header fields.
The following HTTP/1.1 header fields are hop-by-hop headers: Connection, Keep-
Alive, Proxy-Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization, TE, Trailers, Transfer-Encoding
and Upgrade [35]. All the other header fields defined by HTTP/1.1 are end-to-end
header fields. End-to-end header fields should be included for computing the HMAC
header field, but hop-by-hop header fields should be excluded. Other hop-by-hop
header fields must be listed in the Connection header field to be introduced into
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HTTP/1.1 or later [35] and these header fields should be excluded, too. We found
that Via and Warning header fields can be modified in-transit and they should be
excluded for computing the HMAC header field.
Some proxies might convert original contents to some other new formats and
can break the Content-MD5 header field. There are two types of proxies such as a
transparent proxy and a non-transparent proxy. A transparent proxy passes requests
and responses unmodified whereas a non-transparent proxy modifies requests and
responses to converts between image formats for saving cache space or reducing
the amount of traffic. Unfortunately, if a non-transparent proxy converts original
contents to some other new formats, HTTPI cannot work since the Content-MD5
header field will be different for a new format. If an HTTP message includes the
no-transform directive, the cache or the proxy should not change any aspect of
the entity-body specified by the Content-Encoding, the Content-Range, and the
Content-Type header field including the entity-body itself [35]. Thus, no-transform
should be used with HTTPI.
When a cache makes a request to an origin web server, and the origin web
server provides a 304 (Not Modified) response or a 206 (Partial Content) response,
the cache then constructs a response and send the response to a browser. The
304 response from the origin web server contains only header fields and the cache
retrieves the entity-body stored in the cache entry and combine the header fields
and the entity-body to construct an HTTP response to the browser. The origin
web server can still use HTTPI for this caching protocol if the origin web server
includes the Content-MD5, the HMAC and the HMAC-control header field. Since
the HMAC header field is computed only with header fields, the origin web server
can compute the HMAC header field and the origin web server needs to enumerate
all the header fields to compute the HMAC header field in the must-include header
field since the cache may include more header fields than the header fields provided
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by the origin web server. When the cache receives the 304 response from the origin
web server, the cache can combine the entity-body in the cache entry as usual.
When the browser receives the HTTP response from the cache, the browser can
check the HMAC header field by computing all the enumerated header fields in the
must-include header field and the Content-MD5 of the entity-body. The request to
the 304 response includes the If-Modified-Since or the If-None-Match header field
to check whether objects are modified or not after the browser receives the content
previously. The If-Modified-Since header field is based on the Last-Modified header
field and check whether the objects are modified from the date in the Last-Modified
header field. The If-None-Match header field depends on the ETag header field and
the origin web server should ensure that the ETag header field is uniquely changed
whenever a content is changed. In both cases, the origin web server might not be able
to generate the Last-Modified or the ETag header field if web objects are generated
dynamically from a database. It is difficult to know when the objects are generated
and how the objects have a unique ETag if they are generated dynamically. Due
to these limitations, Nottingham proposes to use the Content-MD5 header filed for
a strong cache validation with a new header field called If-Not-Hash instead of the
If-Modified-Since and the If-None-Match [91] header field. Moreover, MD5 hash can
be used to detect duplicate transfer [85]. A traditional web cache indexes each entry
by a given URL, but this can cause a redundant payload transfer by a cache miss
between proxies and origin web servers. Therefore, Content-MD5 can be beneficial
not only for integrity but also for performance.
2.5 Compatibility with Middle Boxes
We argued in the previous two Sections that HTTPI has several security advantages
over HTTP: first HTTPI provides some security guarantees that cannot be provided
by HTTP (Section 2.2), and second HTTPI can defend against some cyber attacks
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Figure 2.2: Compatibility with Cache Proxies
that cannot be defended against by HTTP (Section 2.3). This means that the World
Wide Web needs to support HTTPI beside, or instead of, HTTP especially since
we show in the next Section that the performance of HTTPI is very close to that of
HTTP.
On the other hand, one may argue that the web may not need to support
HTTPI beside HTTPS since HTTPS can be used, instead of HTTPI, in those ap-
plications that only need HTTPI. But we refute this argument in two ways. First,
we argue in this Section that HTTPI is compatible with middle boxes, such as cache
proxies and application firewalls, in the Internet whereas HTTPS is not. Second, we
show in the next Section experimental results which demonstrate that the through-
put of HTTPI is 37% higher than that of HTTPS and the CPU execution time of
HTTPI is 23% lower than that of HTTPS. Therefore, there are significant perfor-
mance gains to be had when HTTPI is used in place of HTTPS in those applications
that do not require message confidentiality.
In the remainder of this Section, we discuss how HTTPI is compatible with
two important types of middle boxes: cache proxies and application firewalls.
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2.5.1 Compatibility with Cache Proxies
Consider the case where a client C uses HTTPI to communicate with a web server
S, and assume that all the exchanged (request and response) messages between
C and S reach a cache proxy PR after they are sent and before they reach their
ultimate destinations. Note that PR does not know the session key for the current
HTTPI session between C and S. Yet, PR can still read each request message from
C to S (since none of the messages is encrypted) and determine whether or not the
requested web page in the request message is already stored in PR.
There are two possible scenarios in this case:
1. If the requested web page is not in PR, then PR forwards the request message
to S. Later, when S sends back the requested page in a response message,
PR stores a copy of the requested page in its memory before forwarding the
response message to C.
2. If the requested web page is already in PR, then PR applies the secure hash
function MD5 to the page and sends the result along with the session ID (for
the HTTPI session between C and S) to server S. Later server S computes
the header hash for the requested page and sends it to PR. Then PR prepares
the response message, that has the requested web page and the header hash,
and sends it to C. The exchanged messages in this scenario are illustrated in
Figure 2.2.
Note that in Scenario 1, the requested web page was sent all the way from
S to PR then to C, whereas in Scenario 2, the requested page is sent only from PR
to C. Thus, the saving in communication is achieved since in most cases Scenario 2
is much more likely to occur than Scenario 1.
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2.5.2 Compatibility with Application Firewalls
Consider the case where a client C uses HTTPI to communicate with a web server
S. Assume that all the request messages from C reach a server firewall SF before
reaching S, and all the response messages from S reach a client firewall CF before
reaching C.
When SF receives a request message, it checks whether the cookies in the
message header are correct (i.e. could have been sent earlier by server F), and
whether the Javascript code in the POST data of the message, if any, is harmless.
Based on these checks, SF decides either to forward the request message to server
S or to discard the message.
When CF receives a response message, it checks whether the Javascript code
in the web page in the message, if any, is harmless. Based on these checks, CF decides
either to forward the response message to client C or to discard the message.
Note that the two application firewalls SF and CF can perform their func-
tions, even though they do not know the session key for the current HTTPI session
between C and S, because none of the exchanged messages between C and S is
encrypted.
2.6 Experimental Results
In this Section, we describe an experiment that we carried out to compare the
performance of HTTPI against the performance of HTTP and of HTTPS, when
HTTP and HTTPS are used in place of HTTPI.
This experiment involves a client machine and a server machine with Ubuntu
8.04. The client machine is an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU @ 3.16 GHz with 2 GB RAM.
The server machine is an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU @ 3.00 GHz with 2 GB RAM. The
client and the server machine are connected using a 100 Mb/second Ethernet. The
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server machine hosts an Apache version 2.2.11 server which supports both HTTP
and HTTPS. We augmented this Apache server with a new module that implements
HTTPI.
We made the augmented Apache server host three web pages, which we
obtained from the web: an Amazon page, a Facebook page, and a New York Times
page. The characteristics of these three pages are as follows:
(1) The Amazon page consists of a container HTML page that has 172 KB, and
53 files of images, scripts, and style sheets totaling 484 KB.
(2) The Facebook page consists of a container HTML page that has 360 KB, and
51 files of images, scripts, and style sheets totaling 1.1 MB.
(3) The New York Times page consists of a container HTML page that has 140
KB, and 94 files of images, scripts, and style sheets totaling 1.1 MB.
The experiment consists of three stages:
(1) In the first stage, the client machine communicates with the server machine
using HTTPI and the two machines execute X transactions, where X = 20, 60,
and 100 and a transaction consists of the client machine sending one request
message and the server machine replying back with a response message that
includes the requested web page (Note that the value of X is chosen to be
relatively large since the lifetime of an HTTPI connection is intended to be
relatively long as discussed in Section 2.1.2 above).
(2) The second stage of the experiment is the same as the first stage except that
the client machine and the server machine communicate using HTTP (instead
of HTTPI).
(3) The third stage of the experiment is the same as the first stage except that the
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client machine and the server machine communicate using HTTPS (instead of
HTTPI).
In each stage of the experiment we measured two parameters: network
throughput (in KB/second) and CPU execution time (in seconds). We ran each
stage 5 times and measured the average. The measured results of this experiment
are shown in Figure 2.3(a) to 2.3(f). Figure 2.3(a), 2.3(b), and 2.3(c) show the
network throughput when the requested web page is Amazon, Facebook, and New
York Times, respectively. Figure 2.3(d), 2.3(e), and 2.3(f) show the CPU execution
time when the requested web page is Amazon, Facebook, and New York Times, re-
spectively. From these figures, we conclude that the throughput of HTTPI is within
1.2% from that of HTTP and is about 37% better than that of HTTPS. We also
conclude that the CPU time of HTTPI is within 1.9% from that of HTTP and is
about 23% better than that of HTTPS.
From these results, we conclude that there is a significant performance gain
that can be achieved by using HTTPI, instead of HTTPS, when message confiden-
tiality is not required. Therefore, supporting HTTPI beside HTTPS in the web
seems to be a reasonable design option.
For completeness, we repeated our experiment when the client machine and
the server machine are connected using a 1 Gb/second fast Ethernet in Figure 2.4.
The results show the same trends as those in Figure 2.3.
2.7 Related Work
Many solutions for the message modification problem of HTTP page are proposed,
but none of these address server impersonation, message integrity, and cookie theft
and injection attacks comprehensively like HTTPI. A solution for server imper-
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Figure 2.4: Performance Comparisons between HTTP, HTTPS, and HTTPI in 1
Gbps Internet
Likewise a solution for DNS rebinding will not work as one for DNS cache poi-
soning though these attacks are server impersonation attacks. On the other hand,
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HTTPI defends against these attacks totally. Furthermore, an attacker can create
new attacks by sidestepping existing defenses and combining attacks vectors like
server impersonation, message integrity, and cookie theft and injection. Neverthe-
less, HTTPI defends against not only existing attacks, but also these new attacks.
2.7.1 Server Authentication
Attackers launch server impersonation attacks in many ways such as Pharming
[96, 97, 111], DNS rebinding [60], DNS cache poisoning [115], and ARP poisoning
[124, 126]. These attacks are possible because identities are not correctly bound to
its indirection. For exaple, attackers need to map domain names with attackers’ IP
addresses for DNS attacks. Similarly, attackers need to associate IP addresses with
attackers’ MAC addresses for MAC attacks.
A solution for DNS rebinding does not work as one for DNS cache poisoning.
For example, DNS pinning is a classic defense against DNS rebinding. DNS pinning
keeps the DNS mappings in a browser cache for a certain period of time and prevents
a domain name from being rebound with an attacker’s IP address. DNS pinning
works for DNS rebinding, but it does not address DNS cache poisoning. DNS cache
poisoning corrupts the DNS mapping in a default DNS’s cache, but DNS rebinding
corrupts the DNS mapping in a browser’s cache.
A solution for DNS misbinding, DNS rebinding, does not work as one for
MAC misbinding. DNS pinning concerns the mapping between IP addresses and
domain names, and MAC misbinding concerns the mapping between IP addresses
and MAC addresses. For example, SSLStrip [76] is a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attack using ARP poisoning. Most HTTPS-enabled web sites allow a user to initiate
an HTTPS session with HTTP. If the user types a URL without https, the user’s
browser assumes its protocol as http. Then, a target web site redirects the user to
https. SSLStrip makes use of this convention and an attacker uses ARP poisoning
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to route packets to the attacker’s MAC address. When the user initiates http
connection with the target web site, the attacker establishes an HTTP connection
with the browser and an HTTPS connection with the target web site. The HTTP-
to-HTTPS redirection problem is addressed by ForceHTTPS [59]. If ForceHTTPS
cookie is set or configured by a user, the user’s browser initiates a protocol with
https instead of http by URL rewrite rules.
In order to resolve server impersonation attacks, we must take every binding
into account. Instead, we might consider the root cause of server impersonation
attacks and ensure server authentication for misbinding. HTTPI is not designed to
solve any specific server impersonation attack in mind, but HTTPI addresses the set
of problems, server impersonation attacks with server authentication. Thus, HTTPI
provides a consistent defense against server impersonation attacks.
2.7.2 Message Integrity
HTTP provides the Content-Length [35] and the Content-MD5 [86] header fields for
message integrity. The Content-Length header field provides the size of the content
in a web page by bytes. The Content-MD5 [86] header field indicates the MD5 hash
of the content in a web page. Given the Content-MD5, it is hard to find the same
MD5 value with a different content. On the contrary, given the Content-Length
header field, it is easy to modify the content by substitution. But, in both cases,
there is no guarantee that those header fields are neither modified nor omitted.
Web Tripwire [98] is an integrity mechanism to detect the modification of
HTTP pages in web applications by comparing requested HTTP pages with the
known good representations of requested HTTP pages using a tripwire script. The
detection mechanism of Web Tripwire is limited to received contents, especially only
to an HTML page and there is no page integrity from a client to a web server. In
addition to that, there is no message integrity about HTTP redirection or HTTP
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error messages though these redirections or error messages are easily used by at-
tackers to trick users. Furthermore, Web Tripwire requires more bandwidth for the
known good representations of any requested web page by 17%.
HTTPI requires three more header fields of 160 bytes and the size of these
header fields does not vary depending on the size of contents, but Web Tripwire
requires more bandwidth depending on the size of contents. Nevertheless, Web
Tripwire is not cryptographically secure and a false positive and a false negative
can occur. On the other hand, HTTPI provides a complete solution for message in-
tegrity in HTTP pages without false positives and false negatives. HTTPI provides
message integrity for both HTTP requests and HTTP responses and for any web ob-
jects. Saltzman and Sharabani proposes HTTP Response Signing [104], but signing
requires more computation than hashing and it only protects HTTP responses.
HTTP header fields can be omitted or modified, but new HTTP header fields
are proposed to defend against web attacks. Without HTTP header integrity, these
new HTTP header fields are futile. For example, the HTTP Referer header field can
be used to mitigate CSRF attacks. Furthermore, the HTTP Origin header field [11]
is proposed for Login CSRF attacks due to the privacy leaks by the HTTP Ref-
erer header field. Yet, HTTP does not have any proper header protection. HTTPI
provides message integrity for HTTP header fields. Thus, HTTPI can be comple-
mentary to many proposals relying on HTTP header fields.
2.7.3 Cookie Integrity
SessionLock [2] is proposed for cookie theft. SessionLock secures web sessions against
SideJacking [46] by using a session secret shared between a browser and a web server
over TLS. The browser uses the session secret to authenticate to the web server by
keyed-hashing timestamp and a request URL in every subsequent HTTP request.
Fu et al. [40] propose to use a server key to protect cookies from being forged, but
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the cookies using a server key can be replayed until the cookies expire. HTTPI
defends against cookie theft with the cookie verifier. The cookie verifier protects
cookies from being forged and replayed. If only a server key is used, it protects
cookies from being forged, but not replayed. HTTPI protects cookies from being
replayed as well as forged by using a session key and a server key.
Session Fixation [72] is a cookie injection attack. Attackers can inject cookies
by server impersonation or by message modification. With HTTPI, attackers cannot
inject cookies since HTTP provide server authentication and message integrity. Even
though attackers inject cookies, web servers can verify and reject cookies with the
cookie verifier.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
The research reported in this Chapter is motivated by the observation that the
transport protocol HTTPS, which provides security over the World Wide Web, is
overkill for many open web applications, such as web email, social networking, and
web blogging. This is because HTTPS provides message confidentiality to all web
applications, typically at a high cost, even when the web applications do not require
message confidentiality.
The cost of HTTPS providing message confidentiality is two-fold:
1. Because HTTPS encrypts and decrypts each sent (request or response) mes-
sage, the throughput of HTTPS is reduced by about 40%.
2. Because each HTTPS (request or response) message is encrypted using a sym-
metric key that is not known to any of the middle boxes in the Internet, none
of these middle boxes can process these messages. Thus, all the gains that
could have been offered by the middle boxes in the Internet are lost whenever
HTTPS is used.
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To resolve this mismatch between what HTTPS provides and what many
open web applications require, we propose in this Chapter a new web transport
protocol named HTTPI. This new protocol is designed to provide all the security
guarantees provided by HTTPS, except one – message confidentiality. Thus, web
applications that do not require message confidentiality, and there are many of them,
can be deployed on top of this new protocol rather than on top of HTTPS. (However,
web applications, that do require message confidentiality, such as web banking, can
still be deployed on top of HTTPS.)
There are two significant advantages of using HTTPI over using HTTPS:
a. Our experimental results, in Section 2.6, showed that the throughput of HTTPI
is almost 40% better than that of HTTPS.
b. As discussed in Section 2.5, HTTPI is compatible with, and can take full
advantage of, the middle boxes in the Internet. By contrast, HTTPS is not
compatible with, and cannot utilize any of the middle boxes in the Internet.
Our experimental results in Section 2.6 also showed that the throughput
of HTTPI is within 1.2% of that of HTTP. Therefore, if HTTPI happens to re-
place HTTP as the baseline transport protocol over the web, then the reduction
in throughput can go unnoticed by most web users. On the other hand, the im-
provement of security (e.g. as discussed in Section 2.3, HTTPI can defend against
Pharming attacks but HTTP cannot) can be appreciated and cheered by all users.
Finally, we observe that the relationship between HTTPI and HTTPS is
analogous to the relationship between the IP Authentication Header (AH) [68] and
the IP Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) [69] in IPsec [70]. Thus, just as both




TLP: Transport Login Protocol
The conventional wisdom has always been that users should refrain from entering
their sensitive data (such as usernames, passwords, and credit card numbers) into
HTTP (or white) pages, but they can enter these data into HTTPS (or yellow)
pages. Unfortunately, this assumption is not valid as it became clear recently that,
through human mistakes or Phishing or Pharming attacks, a displayed yellow page
may not be the same one that the user had intended to request in the first place.
In this Chapter, we propose to add a third class of secure web pages called brown
pages. We show that brown pages are more secure than yellow pages especially
in the face of human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks. Thus, users
can enter their sensitive data into brown pages without worry. We present a login
protocol, called the Transport Login Protocol or TLP for short. An HTTPS web
page that is displayed on the browser is classified brown by the browser if and only
if this web page has been called into the browser either through TLP or from within
another brown page that had been called earlier into the browser through TLP. TLP
was published in [22].
When a user needs to display a web page on his browser, the user follows
any one of four direction rules, described below, to request that his browser calls
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the page and displays it on the screen. If the requested page is an (insecure) HTTP
page, then the browser calls the page and displays it without any firm guarantee
that the displayed page is the one that the user has requested. On the other hand,
if the requested page is a (secure) HTTPS page, then the browser displays the page
only after it has authenticated that the page is the one that the user has requested.
Unfortunately, as described below, the authentication procedure is vulnerable to
human mistakes, by the user, and to Phishing and Pharming attacks [92], by adver-
sarial web sites. And so it is possible that the displayed page may not be the one
requested by the user after all.
The user may not mind that the displayed page is different from the page
that he has requested for two reasons. First, both the displayed page and the page
that the user has requested have similar graphics and colors and the user may not
notice that the displayed page is actually not the one that he has requested even
in the presence of security indicators [26]. Second, the user may notice that the
displayed page is not the one that he has requested, but he may believe that the
displayed page is a legitimate redirection that was requested by the page that he
has requested. In any case, the user may proceed to enter some sensitive data,
such as his credit card number, into the displayed page which may happen to be an
adversarial page.
This Chapter is dedicated to prevent these scenarios from occurring. Towards
this end, we propose to introduce a new class of HTTPS web pages, which we refer
to as brown pages. As discussed below, brown pages are secure against human
mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks. Thus, when a user requests that his
browser calls and displays an HTTPS page and then the browser displays the page
and classifies it brown, the user knows that the displayed page is indeed the one
that he has requested and so he can proceed to enter his sensitive data into it.
In order for the browser to be able to classify a called HTTPS page brown,
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the browser needs to call this page through a login protocol that is completely secure
against human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks. In this Chapter, we
present and discuss the design and implementation of such a login protocol.
3.1 Attack Scenarios
In this Section, we describe three attack scenarios, caused by human mistakes or
Phishing or Pharming attacks [48,78]. In each one of these scenarios, a user intends
to call into his browser a particular HTTPS page, but he ends up calling a wrong
HTTPS page into his browser.
1. Human Mistakes:
A user intends to enter the URL https://www.amazon.com into the URL box
of his browser. But he enters the wrong URL https://www.anazon.com by
mistake.
2. Phishing Attacks:
A user receives an email that urges the user to click on a link described as
leading to the web site https://www.amazon.com. By clicking on this link,
the user ends up in the wrong web site https://www.anazon.com.
3. Pharming Attacks:
For the convenience of its users, the web site https://www.amazon.com allows
its users to call the web site using the alternative insecure URL http://www.
amazon.com. Now, the DNS of a user can be manipulated so that when the
user uses this insecure URL to request the web site, the user’s DNS directs
the request to an adversarial web site that redirects the user’s browser to the
wrong web site https://www.anazon.com.
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In each one of these three scenarios, the user intended to call into his browser
the web site https://www.amazon.com, but he ends up calling the wrong web site
https://www.anazon.com. The user does not notice the switch, from https://www.
amazon.com to https://www.anazon.com, because the two web sites have similar
logos, graphics, and colors, and maybe similar URLs. Thus the user proceeds to
enter his sensitive information (such as username, password, or credit card numbers)
into the wrong web site. The objective of this Chapter is to outline a proposal to
counter these three attack scenarios.
One method to counter these scenarios is to advise the user to be careful
and check the URL box of the displayed HTTPS web page on his browser before he
enters his sensitive data into the displayed web page. However, it is very difficult
for a user to remember and follow this advice every time he requests an HTTPS
web page.
A second method to counter these scenarios is to make the browser check,
before it displays an HTTPS web page, that this page is indeed the one that the
user wants. Unfortunately, the browser cannot tell whether or not the user wants
the web page whose URL is in the URL box.
The method that we adopt in this Chapter to counter these scenarios is as
follows. Browser B of user U displays an HTTPS page from a web site S when and
only when the following three conditions hold.
1. User U has requested the page.
2. Site S has verified that sometime in the past user U has registered and stored
his login data in site S.
3. Browser B has verified that sometime in the past user U has registered and
stored his login data in site S.
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If any one of these three conditions does not hold, then the browser of user U
refuses to display the requested page. The correctness of this method is based on the
reasonable assumption that each web site in which user U registers is a legitimate,
rather than an adversarial, site. Next, we argue that this method can counter the
above three scenarios.
Consider the first scenario. If user U intends to request the web site https://
www.amazon.com, but by mistake requests the web site https://www.anazon.com,
then only one of two outcomes is possible. The most likely outcome is that user
U has not registered in the web site https://www.anazon.com and so the browser
of user U will not display the web page. The second outcome is that user U has
registered in the web site https://www.anazon.com and so the browser will display
the legitimate web page of this site and user U will notice that the displayed page
is not the one that he wants.
Now consider the second and third scenarios. In these scenarios, the web site
https://www.anazon.com is an adversarial site and so user U has not registered in
it. Thus, the browser of user U will not display the web page.
3.2 Countering the Attack Scenarios
In this Section, we outline our proposal to modify the browser and some web sites
in order to counter the attack scenarios, caused by human mistakes and Phishing
and Pharming attacks, discussed in the previous Section. Our proposal consists of
three parts.
1. White, Yellow, and Brown Pages:
We propose to modify the browser so that the browser classifies each displayed
HTTP web page as white, and classifies each displayed HTTPS web page as
either yellow or brown. As described below, a user should regard each white
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page as insecure, each yellow page as mildly secure (which means that the
page is vulnerable to human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks),
and each brown page as highly secure (which means that the page is secure
against human mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks).
2. A New Login Protocol:
We also propose to add a new login protocol to the browser and to some web
sites that need to be (extra) secure against human mistakes and Phishing and
Pharming attacks. We call this new login protocol the Transport Login Pro-
tocol or TLP for short. When a user invokes TLP on his browser and requests
the browser to call a web page on a specified web site, the following three
steps are executed. First, the browser and the specified web site use TLP to
establish mutual authentication between each other. Second, if the mutual
authentication between the browser and the web site succeeds, then the web
site redirects the browser to an HTTPS web page. Third, the browser calls
the secure web page and, upon receiving it, the browser assigns it a brown
classification and displays it to the user.
3. Classification of Web Pages:
The modified browser assigns a classification, white, yellow, or brown, to each
displayed web page, depending on how this page has been called into the
browser in the first place. Thus the same displayed HTTPS page can be
assigned a yellow classification if it is called into the browser one way, and
assigned a brown classification if it is called into the browser another way. We
adopt the following classification rules.
(a) Any HTTP page, that is called into the browser, is classified white by
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the browser.
(b) Any HTTPS page, that is called into the browser using our login protocol
TLP, is classified brown by the browser.
(c) Any HTTPS page, that is called into the browser using the TLS protocol
[14], is either classified yellow if this page is called from within a displayed
white or yellow page, or classified brown if this page is called from within
a displayed brown page.
When the browser displays a web page, the browser makes its classification of
the displayed page clear to the user by choosing an appropriate background color for
the URL box. If the displayed page is white (or yellow or brown respectively), then
the background color for the URL box is white (or yellow or brown respectively).
Note that the current browser already supports white and yellow classifications of
web pages. So the main contributions of this project are merely the addition of
brown classifications and the introduction of the new login protocol TLP which can
be used in calling brown web pages into the browser.
(Recently, a green classification of HTTPS web pages has been introduced
to distinguish those HTTPS pages that have extended validation certificates [36].
Clearly some green pages, like yellow pages, can still be adversarial, and can still be
used in launching Phishing and Pharming attacks as described above. Henceforth,
when we refer to yellow pages, we do mean yellow or green pages.)
The policy for entering sensitive data (such as usernames, passwords, and
credit card numbers) into a displayed web page depends on the classification of the
displayed page. This policy consists of the following three rules.
1. The White Page Rule:
A user should never enter sensitive data into a white page.
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2. The Brown Page Rule:
A user can enter sensitive data into a brown page.
3. The Yellow Page Rule:
Before a user can enter sensitive data into a yellow page, the user should have
prior knowledge that this data can be entered into this particular page, and
the user should check that the URL box of the displayed page has indeed the
URL of this particular page.
3.3 The Current Login Protocol
Our login protocol TLP, described in the next Section, enjoys a number of nice
features that are not all present in any of the current login protocols. These nice
features are as follows.
1. Immunity to Attacks:
When a user U uses TLP to log into a site S, then the login succeeds if and
only if both browser B of user U and site S can verify that user U has regis-
tered (and stored some login data) in site S sometime in the past.
2. No External Servers:
All the login data, that are needed by user U to use TLP and successfully log
into site S, are stored on site S. Thus TLP does not need any external servers
to store some of the login data.
3. One-Time Login Data:
In TLP, the login data, that are needed by user U to log into site S, are
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updated after each successful login of U into S. Therefore, if an adversary
somehow steals the login data of user U in site S, then the stolen data be-
comes useless after the next login of U into S.
4. Universal Passwords:
Each user U needs only to memorize one password P , called the TLP universal
password of U . User U employs his universal password in the TLP protocol to
log into every web site. No web site S can deduce the TLP universal password
of user U from the login data that user U stores in S or from the messages
exchanged between the browser of U and site S during the execution of TLP.
5. Standard Cryptography:
TLP uses only standard symmetric cryptography and standard secure hash
functions. Thus, every time the standards of symmetric cryptography or of
hash functions are updated, the standards of TLP are updated accordingly.
Next we argue that none of the login protocols, that have been proposed
recently, enjoys all these five features.
The current login protocol over the web consists of two protocols: the stan-
dard TLS protocol [14] (which is used to authenticate a secure web site by the
browser), and a non-standard password protocol (which is sometimes used to au-
thenticate the secure web site by the user and to authenticate the user by the secure
web site). As described in Section 3.1, this login protocol is vulnerable to human
mistakes and Phishing and Pharming attacks, and so it does not enjoy feature 1.
This login protocol can be strengthened using Site Keys which allow a user to
authenticate the identity of the web site being logged into [10, 108]. Unfortunately,
Site Keys can be stolen using Man-In-The-Middle Attacks. Thus the strengthened
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protocol still does not enjoy feature 1.
The login protocol SRP [119,120] does not enjoy any of features 3, 4, and 5
above.
The hash-based protocols, such as [41,45,49,67], enjoy the features 2, 4, and
5. They also allow the web site to verify that the user has registered in the site
sometimes in the past. Unfortunately, they do no allow the user’s browser to verify
that the user has registered in the site sometime in the past. Thus these protocols
do not enjoy feature 1. Also, some of these protocols, for example [49], do not enjoy
feature 2.
The Passpet system [122] does not enjoy features 2 and 3.
3.4 The New Login Protocol
Our login protocol TLP is to be executed between browser B of user U and web site
S. Prior to executing TLP, user U needs to have registered with site S by making
its browser B store in S the following tuple of four data items:
(H(U), n, H(0, n, P, S), H2(1, n, P, S))
where
U is the username of the user,
B is the browser of user U ,
n is a nonce selected at random by browser B,
H is a standard secure hash function,
0 is the character zero,
1 is the character one,
P is the TLP universal password of user U , and
S is the domain name of the web site.
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Note that H(0, n, P, S) denotes the application of the secure hash function H to the
concatenation of the four data items 0, n, P , and S. Also, H2(1, n, P, S) denotes
two consecutive applications of function H to the concatenation of the four data
items 1, n, P , and S. After B stores this tuple in S, B forgets the tuple completely.
Executing TLP between browser B and site S is intended to achieve five
objectives.
1. B checks that S is one of the sites where user U had previously registered (and
stored the above tuple of four data items).
2. S checks that user U has entered his universal password P to browser B.
3. Both B and S agree on a symmetric session key that they can use to encrypt
and decrypt their exchanged messages.
4. B selects a new random nonce n′ and stores the following tuple of four data
items in S in place of the above tuple:
(H(U), n′, H(0, n′, P, S), H2(1, n′, P, S))
(Therefore, each successful login of browser B into site S causes the tuple of
four data items that B had previously stored in S to be replaced by a new
tuple of four data items also provided by B.)
5. S sends to B the URL of the next HTTPS page that B needs to call, using TLS,
along with a cookie identifying user U and testifying that the login procedure
between U ’s browser and S, has been successful. When the next HTTPS page
is called into B, B assigns this page a brown classification. Moreover browser
B assigns any other HTTPS page, that is called using TLS from within this
brown page, a brown classification .
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We adopt the following notation in describing a field in a message that is
sent during the execution of TLP.
[expression1] < expression2 >
This notation means that the value of expression1 is used as a symmetric key to
encrypt the value of expression2 before the message is sent.
To start executing TLP between B and S, user U enters three data items,
namely U , P , and S, to a local web page named httpl stored in browser B. Then
the execution of TLP proceeds with the following four message exchanges between
B and S.
B → S : {Hello Message}
U
B ← S : {Hello-Reply Message}
n, [H(0, n, P, S)] < SN >
B → S : {Login Message}
U ,
[H2(1, n, P, S)] < H(1, n, P, S), BN,H2(1, n′, P, S) >,
[H(BN,SN)] < n′, H(0, n′, P, S) >
B ← S : {Login-Reply Message}
[H(BN,SN)] < URL of next HTTPS web page >,
[H(BN,SN)] < cookie >
The hello message, from B to S, consists of the username of user U who
wants to log into site S. On receiving this message, S fetches the tuple
(H(U), n,H(0, n, P, S), H2(1, n, P, S))
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that B had stored previously in S. Then S uses the data item H(0, n, P, S) as a
symmetric key to encrypt a new nonce SN that S selects at random. The result of
the encryption is denoted [H(0, n, P, S)] < SN > and is included in the hello-reply
message that is sent from S to B.
After B receives the hello-reply message, it computes H(0, n, P, S) and uses
it to obtain the nonce SN from the received message. Then, B selects at random
two nonces BN and n′, and uses the received SN and the computed BN and n′ to
construct the login message before sending it to site S.
After S receives the login message, it performs four tasks. First, it checks that
user U has indeed entered its TLP universal password P into browser B. Second,
S extracts the nonce BN from the received message, and now both B and S know
BN and SN . Third, S stores the tuple:
(H(U), n′, H(0, n′, P, S), H2(1, n′, P, S)) in place of the earlier tuple. Fourth,
S constructs the login-reply message and sends it to browser B.
After B receives the login-reply message, it concludes that S is one of the
web sites where user U has previously registered. Moreover, B gets the URL of the
HTTPS page that B needs to call next using TLS, along with a cookie that identifies
user U and testifies to the fact that the login procedure between U ’s browser and S
has been successful.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the five steps that are needed for a user to use TLP to
log into a web site in a domain say xyz.com.
1. The user calls a local web page, for convenience named the httpl page, on
his browser and enters his username, his TLP universal password, and the site
address www.xyz.com into this page.
2. The browser uses DNS to get the IP address of site www.xyz.com.
3. The browser and site www.xyz.com execute TLP. At the end, the browser
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Figure 3.1: Using TLP
receives the URL of a web page on site online.xyz.com and a cookie.
4. The browser uses DNS to get the IP address of site online.xyz.com.
5. The browser and site online.xyz.com execute TLS, and the browser gets the
required HTTPS page at the end. The browser classifies this page brown. It
also classifies any other HTTPS page, that is called using TLS from within
this page, brown.
3.5 Correctness of TLP
An adversary has no chance to succeed in attacking TLP between the browser of
user U and web site S unless the adversary acquires a login tuple of U in S:
(H(U), n,H(0, n, P, S), H2(1, n, P, S))
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Moreover, an adversary cannot acquire such a login tuple unless the adversary
succeeds in breaking into the secure database(s) where site S stores the login tuples
of all its users – a hard task to perform!
Even if an adversary somehow succeeds in acquiring a login tuple of U in
site S, this adversary cannot succeed in launching a user impersonation attack, a
human mistake attack, or a Phishing attack against TLP between the browser of U
and S.
1. Security against User Impersonation:
If an adversary acquires a login tuple of user U in site S, and if this adversary
uses this tuple to impersonate a browser of user U and execute TLP in order
to log into site S, then the adversary’s attempt to log into site S will fail.
2. Security against Human Mistakes and Phishing Attacks:
If an adversary acquires a login tuple of user U in site S, and if this adversary
uses this tuple to establish an adversarial web site S′ whose domain is different
from that of S, and if user U requests that his browser executes TLP and logs
into site S′, then the login attempt will fail.
Still, if it is possible for an adversary to acquire a login tuple of user U in site
S, then this adversary can launch successful Pharming and eavesdropping attacks
against TLP between the browser of U and S. To protect against this possibility,
the login tuple of U in S is partitioned into two subtuples:
(H(U), n,H(0, n, P, S)) and (H(U), H2(1, n, P, S))
Each subtuple is stored in a different database. Thus, the first subtuple is
stored in database 0 and the second subtuple is stored in database 1. When user
U initially registers in site S, the browser of U generates the first login tuple and
sends it to site S. Site S divides the received login tuple into two subtuples and
stores the first subtuple in database 0 and stores the second subtuple in database 1.
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Later when user U attempts to log into site S, site S forwards each of the
messages that S receives from U ’s browser to the appropriate database so that this
database can process the message and return a reply to S which forwards the reply
back to U ’s browser. For example, when S receives the Hello(U) message from U ’s
browser, S selects a nonce SN at random and sends both U and SN to database 0
which prepares a Hello-Reply(n, [H(0, n, P, S)] < SN >) message and returns it to
S which forwards it back to U ’s browser. Thus no one, not even site S, gets to keep
track of the subtuples stored in the two databases 0 and 1.
Because the two subtuples of user U in site S are continuously changing, it
is reasonable then to assume that an adversary, who attempts to acquire the two
subtuples of the same user U from the two databases 0 and 1, will do so at different
times and will end up with two unsynchronized subtuples of the following form:
(H(U), n,H(0, n, P, S)) and (H(U), H2(1, n′, P, S))
Fortunately, if an adversary who succeeds only in acquiring two unsynchro-
nized subtuples of user U in site S, then this adversary cannot succeed in launching
a Pharming or eavesdropping attack against TLP between the browser of U and S.
3. Security against Pharming Attacks:
If an adversary acquires two unsynchronized subtuples of user U in site S,
and if this adversary uses these subtuples to establish an adversarial site S′
whose domain is the same as that of site S, and if the DNS of U ’s browser
is manipulated so that U ’s browser is directed to site S′ instead of S, and if
U requests that his browser executes TLP and logs into site S, then the login
attempt will fail.
4. Security against Eavesdropping:
If an adversary acquires two unsynchronized subtuples of user U in site S, and
if this adversary attempts to eavesdrop on the TLP communication between
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U ’s browser and S and obtain the cookie that is sent (encrypted) in the Login-
Reply message of TLP, then the eavesdrop attempt will fail.
It is straightforward to prove that TLP satisfies the above four properties 1
through 4. To prove that TLP satisfies each of these properties, it is sufficient to
identify a data item that the adversary will need, but will not be able to compute
from its acquired data, in order to complete executing TLP successfully.
To prove that TLP satisfies Property 1, note that the adversary will not be
able to compute the data item H(1, n, P, S), even though it has acquired a login
tuple of user U in site S, that is needed to compute the Login Message of TLP.
To prove that TLP satisfies Property 2, note that the adversary will not be
able to compute the data item H(0, n, P, S′), even though it has acquired a login
tuple of user U in site S, that is needed to compute the Hello-Reply Message of
TLP.
To prove that TLP satisfies Property 3, note that the adversary will not
be able to compute the data item H2(1, n, P, S), even though it has acquired two
unsynchronized subtuples of user U in site S, that is needed to decrypt the Login
Message of TLP and obtain BN .
To prove that TLP satisfies Property 4, note that the adversary will not be
able to compute the data item BN , even though it has acquired two unsynchronized
subtuples of user U in site S, that is needed to decrypt the cookie in the Login-Reply
Message of TLP.
3.6 User Interface of TLP
As a proof of concept, we have developed a prototype of our Transport Login Proto-
col TLP. The browser side of our prototype is developed on the Firefox browser using
the two technologies of Javascript and HTML. The web site side of our prototype is
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Figure 3.2: User Interface of TLP
developed on the Tomcat web server using four technologies: Java, HTML, the JSP
(Java Server Page) technology, and the MySQL database technology. Note that the
MySQL database technology is used to manage the login tuples, of all users, that
are stored in the web site.
We employed standard cryptography in our prototype. In particular, we
employed the Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-1 for secure hash, and employed the
Advanced Encryption Standard AES for symmetric key cryptography.
The guiding principle in our prototype is to ensure that the user never enters
his TLP universal password into a web page that is supplied by a web site, but he
can enter his password into a local web page that is supplied by his own browser.
It turns out that this principle is hard to fulfill in our prototype in the light of the
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“Same Origin Policy” that is adopted by the Javascript technology. At the end,
however, we were able to fulfill this principle by designing a novel user interface for
our prototype. We discuss this user interface next.
Figure 3.2 details the four steps that need to be taken by a user to log into
a web site www.xyz.com.
1. The user first enters httpl into the URL box of his browser and pushes <
return > ; see Figure 4a. This causes a display of the local page httpl to
appear as a small window on the left site of the screen; see Figure 4b.
2. The user enters his username and the name of the site www.xyz.com into page
httpl then clicks on the < submit > button in this page. This causes page
httpl to execute, update its own display, and send a Hello message (the first
message in TLP) to site www.xyz.com which replies by sending back the web
page http://www.xyz.com. This page contains the two fields, named nonce
and hash, of the Hello-Reply message (the second message in TLP); see Figure
4c.
3. The user copies the values of the two fields nonce and hash from the displayed
page http://www.xyz.com and enters them into page httpl. The user then
enters his password into page httpl and clicks on the < submit > button
of this page. This causes page httpl to execute, update its own display,
and send a Login message (the third message in TLP) to site www.xyz.com
which replies by sending back a new web page http://www.xyz.com. This
new page contains one field, named decrypt, of the Login-Reply message (the
last message in TLP); see Figure 4d.
4. The user copies the value of field decrypt from the displayed page http://www.
xyz.com and enters it into page httpl. The user then clicks on the < submit >
button of page httpl. This causes page httpl to execute, compute the next
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HTTPS page, say page https://online.xyz.com, that needs to be called into
the browser, and redirects the browser to call this page using TLS and display
it on the screen. Note that in this case the browser assigns the displayed
HTTPS page a brown classification, and so the background color of the URL
box of the displayed page becomes brown as shown in Figure 3.2.
Because the browser has classified the displayed page https://online.xyz.
com brown, then if the user clicks on any link (of an HTTPS page) in page https:
//online.xyz.com, then the browser will classify the newly called page brown as
well.
3.7 Related Work
Despite advances in security technologies, the Internet is plagued by vulnerabili-
ties. These vulnerabilities exploit technical weaknesses as well as the propensity
of humans to lowering their guards in routine transactions. In our daily web surf-
ing experiences, homograph attacks [42] work very well for this reason. For the
same reason, security indicators in browsers are not enough to prevent a user from
accessing web pages hosted by malicious servers and alternative approaches are re-
quired [26]. While security mechanisms have been relatively successful in protecting
systems from attacks that exploit technical loopholes or syntactic attacks [107],
dealing with semantic attacks has proven much more difficult. As defined by Bruce
Schneier [107], semantics attacks are attacks that depend on the way humans assign
meaning to content. The difficulty of dealing with semantic attacks is due to the
fact that most security systems depend on perfect human behavior that is always
vigilant. In practice, security is not a user’s primary concern and security checks
and warnings can be considered by users as getting in the way of their use of ap-
plications. Thus, user errors result in security failures [116]. The total number of
unique Phishing reports submitted to Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) in
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November 2007 was 28,074 [48]. Gartner says that Phishing attacks are estimated
to have cost $2.8 Billions in the year 2006 alone [78].
3.7.1 Client-based anti-Phishing tools
In order to prevent Phishing in the client side, many anti-Phishing tools are devel-
oped. These anti-Phishing tools are based on blacklists, whitelists, and heuristics.
Netcraft [89] mainly depends on blacklists and it cannot detect a new Phishing
site. Spoof Guard [23] is based on heuristics and it uses domain name, url, link,
and image to evaluate the likelihood that a given page is part of a Phishing at-
tack. SpoofGuard has high catch rate of 90% but also has high false positive rate
of 42% [127]. CANTINA [128] is called a content-based approach since it is not
only based on heuristics similar to Spoof Guard but also based on TF-IDF (Term
Frequency and Inverse Document Frequency) information. It succeeds to reduce the
false positives compared to Spoof Guard. Security toolbars such as SpoofStick [110],
Netcraft Toolbar, Paypal Trustbar [53], eBay Account Guard [29], and SpoofGuard
are designed for humans to use, but usability studies found them all ineffective to
prevent Phishing attacks [117].
3.7.2 Password-based approach
Password Hash [102] is a browser extension that allows users to log into multiple
sites transparently with a universal password. The browser extension applies a
cryptographic hash function to a combination of the plaintext password, domain
name, and a salt. Thus, the break of one system does not lead to that of other sites.
Usability study of Password Hash [17] involving 26 users showed that password hash
suffers from major usability problems. In addition to that, if password hashing is
based on the domain name, it is vulnerable to Pharming attacks [92,111].
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3.7.3 Server-based anti-Phishing
OpenDNS [93] is a way to filter Phishing sites at DNS levels. Thus, it is a black-
list based approach in DNS servers. Phishtank [94] is the online Phishing database
which feeds this information to OpenDNS servers. PhishBouncer [79] uses HTTPS
proxying and attribute-based checks to defend against Phishing attacks. Phish-
Bouncer is based on whitelists, blacklists and heuristics. But it is still vulnerable to
Pharming attacks and requires a HTTPS proxy to be deployed in the Internet.
3.7.4 Cookie-based anti-Phishing
Though cookie-based approaches are effective in preventing Phishing attacks, they
have limitations since cookies can be easily purged and cannot be a permanent
solution for Phishing attacks. Temporary Internet Files (TIFs) are called cache
cookies and are used as authenticators to protect from Phishing and Pharming
attacks [63]. Active Cookies [64] rely on a new protocol that tags cookies with a
specific, valid IP address and the channel redirected by a server and active cookies
are fetched by the server to verify the client. But, it is vulnerable to IP based attacks.
Adversaries can corrupt DNS [8] and BGP [90]. In order to resolve the vulnerabilities
of the most vital function, DNS in the Internet, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)
are proposed [4–6]. However, DNSSEC has obstacles to deploy in the Internet due
to compatibility, scalability, and the ownership of a root key. Locked Cookies [65]
are cookies that are bound to the originating server’s public key. Clients verify the
server by comparing the public key in the locked cookie and the public key presented
by the server. Web Server Key Enabled Cookie (WSKE) [77] bind cookies to domain
names and public keys and similar to locked cookies.
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3.7.5 Interface-based anti-Phishing
Interface-based anti-Phishing is the most popular approach to protect from Phishing
attacks. PassMark [108] is a way to share a secret between a user and a web site
and helps the user authenticate the web site. The user provides the web site with
a shared secret such as an image and/or a passphrase in addition to his regular
password. Some examples include site key [10] of Bank of America and Yahoo Sign-
in Seal [121]. Site key consists of a unique image that users chose, an image title, and
three challenge questions. By showing the unique image to users, users verify the
server. However, site key is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack [123]. Moreover,
the efficacy of security indicators such as HTTPS indicators and site-authentication
images are ineffective where users ignore HTTPS indicators and site-authentication
images [106]. Yahoo Sign-in Seal is a secret message or image that users create to
protect Yahoo accounts. It is similar to site key but it provides a way to create a
customized text message with colors or images that users chose. Challenge questions
are not completely free from security problems since common knowledge such as
mother’s maiden name can be collected in the Internet [47].
Dynamic Security Skins (DSS) [25] uses the trusted password window with
a background image and SRP to authenticate a user and a server. Hash Visualiza-
tion [24] is used to ensure that users are visiting authenticated web pages in DSS.
Web Wallet [118] is a browser sidebar designed for users to submit their sensitive
information. Users are required to press a dedicated security key on the keyboard
to activate Web Wallet. However, Web Wallet itself can also be phished and users
might not use Web Wallet to submit sensitive data.
3.7.6 Certificate-based authentication
Certificates seem to be a panacea for security. However, that PKI can provide se-
curity is a popular falsehood [30]. PKI is more complex than what most people
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think. The problem arises when PKI is not well implemented and practiced. Cer-
tificate Authorities like VeriSign might issue erroneous certificates. VeriSign issued
two VeriSign Class 3 code-signing digital certificates to an individual who fraud-
ulently claimed to be a Microsoft employee [80]. Though VeriSign revoked those
certificates, those certificates might be used if certificate validation is not imple-
mented. The certification path validation algorithm is the algorithm which verifies
that a given certificate path is valid under a given public key infrastructure [55].
This is complex, assuming there are a number of intermediaries between the subject
and the root. Delegated Path Validation (DPV) [95] and Server-based Certificate
Validation Protocol (SCVP) [39] facilitates the validation of certificates.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) [87] is an Internet protocol to
obtain the revocation status of an X.509 digital certificate. Thus, clients must
implement OCSP to check the status of certificates, but it was rarely deployed in
the past.
To remedy Phishing problems, Extended Validation Certificate [36] was pro-
posed. In order to highlight secure sites in IE7, it proposed to use different colors in
URL address box. Unfortunately, this new technique is still vulnerable to picture-
in-picture Phishing attacks and not promising to rectify Phishing problems [61].
3.7.7 Strong Password Protocols
TLS [14] provides privacy communication between two parties, but it does not en-
sure authentication. Strong password protocols provide authentication and pre-
vents eavesdropping and impersonation. Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [12], Aug-
mented EKE (AEKE) [13], Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) [58],
Password Derived Moduli (PDM) [66], and Secure Remote Password (SRP) [119,120]
are Strong password protocols. For mutual authentication, TLS-SRP [113] and TLS-
PSK (Transport Layer Security Pre-shared Key) [32] must be used. Some of the
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objectives of TLP are achieved by the SRP, but not all the objectives of TLP are
achieved by SRP. For example, TLP supports universal passwords but SRP does
not. Also, TLP is simpler than SRP. For example, TLP is based on standard func-
tions for performing secure hash and symmetric encryption and decryption, whereas
SRP is based on a function for performing exponentiation.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
In this Chapter, we present a comprehensive proposal to counter human mistakes
and Phishing and Pharming attacks that may occur when a user attempts to log
in a secure web site. Our proposal is based on two ideas. First, we introduce a
new classification, brown, of secure HTTPS web pages. When the browser of a
user U classifies a displayed page brown, user U should conclude that the displayed
page is secure and can enter his sensitive data into it. Second, we design a new
login protocol, named TLP, that is secure against human mistakes and Phishing
and Pharming attacks. The browser of a user U uses TLP to classify a displayed
page brown according to two rules:
1. The displayed page is called into the browser using TLP.
2. The displayed page is called into the browser, using TLS, from within another
brown page that was displayed earlier on the browser.
Note that TLP is not intended to replace TLS. On the contrary, our vision
assigns complementary roles to be played by TLP and TLS: TLP can be used first
to securely log into a web domain, then TLS can be used later to securely go from
one web site to another within the logged-in domain.
Note also that some mildly secure web domains may feel that they are in
no danger of facing Phishing or Pharming attacks because adversaries have little
incentive to launch such attacks against these domains. (Examples of such domains
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are those that host electronic reviewing and handling of submitted papers to con-
ferences and journals.) These web domains can keep on employing TLS, as they do
presently, both for logging in a domain and for going from one web site to another
within this domain.
A nice feature of TLP is that a user can use the same username and same
(TLP universal) password to securely log into any web site in the Internet. This
means that the user need only to memorize one username and one password for all
web sites. Therefore it is reasonable to demand that each user chooses a long string,
say of sixteen characters, to be his TLP universal password. And so TLP becomes
naturally secure against online and offline dictionary attacks.
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Chapter 4
TPP: The Two-way Password
Protocol
The need for secure communication in the Internet has led to the widespread de-
ployment of secure application-level protocols. The current state-of-the-art is to use
TLS, in conjunction with a password protocol. The password protocol, which we
call a one-way password protocol (OPP), authenticates a user to a server, using a
particular secret called the password. TLS has two functions: (1) It ensures secure
communication between a client and a server and (2) It allows a user to authenti-
cate a server. The first function effectively provides a secure channel for end-to-end
communication between a client and a server. However, the second function is fre-
quently compromised by a variety of Phishing attacks. In this Chapter, we address
this problem by developing a password protocol which we name the Two-way Pass-
word Protocol (TPP). TPP, when used in conjunction with TLS, ensures that users
correctly authenticate servers, and are protected from Phishing attacks. The first
contribution of this Chapter is to develop a protocol, called the Universal Password
Protocol (UPP), which ensures that a user’s password is kept safe even in the case
of a successful Phishing attack. However, it may be noted that a user, after logging
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in, frequently shares other secrets (such as credit card numbers) over the secure
connection, and UPP cannot protect these. Our second contribution is to build
on UPP and develop, first, the Two-Way Password Protocol (TPP), and finally an
improved version named the Dynamic Two-Way Password Protocol (DTPP), which
ensures that both a server and a client are properly authenticated to each other.
This ensures the security of all secrets which should be known only to the client and
the server, including, of course, the password. These protocols were introduced and
published in [20].
A problem of immense importance in any scenario where users with different
privileges use a system is authentication. Clearly, it is necessary for a party that
controls access to a resource to verify the identity of the party requesting access;
otherwise, there is no way to determine which requests to allow, and which to deny.
Thus, authentication is essential whenever an entity provides other specific parties
with access to special resources – for example, by sharing secrets with them. A
major application of this is seen in the use of secure remote protocols in the Internet,
where the resources provided range from email to auctions to banking. In general,
authentication on the Internet involves two parties: a user and a server.
The current state-of-the-art in providing online authentication involves a
combination of two protocols: the Transport Layer Security protocol, or TLS [27],
and a simple password protocol, which we have named the One-Way Password
Protocol OPP. TLS certifies to the user that the server is not spoofing, i.e. presenting
a false address; it also ensures that a user and a server have a cryptographically
secure channel of communication. OPP authenticates the user to the server.
Unfortunately, this combination is not enough to ensure security against
some classes of attack. For example, by simple human error, or by use of a Phishing
attack, a user U may end up going to a malicious server M (say eebay.com) instead
of the actual server S she has a relationship with (in this case, ebay.com). TLS does
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not protest – the site is not spoofing; the address bar indeed says eebay.com, which
is correct. OPP is useless here; it authenticates a user to a server, not a server to
a user. Thus, the adversary M can harvest secrets from U – most importantly the
password authenticating U to S, but also other secrets she might share with S, such
as credit card numbers, home addresses, and so on.
Earlier work in the area of providing security against such attacks, such as
the TLP protocol, have focused on how to strengthen TLS so that it can defend
against these attacks. In the system developed by Choi et al. [22], TLP must be
used for the first login into a secure page; TLS can be used to authenticate pages
subsequently reached from a secure page.
In this Chapter, we study the problem of ensuring secure authentication that
is robust against Phishing attacks (and related problems such as user error). We
achieve this goal using the standard TLS protocol, simply by modifying the password
protocol so it achieves two-way authentication between a server and a user. Our
solution is developed step by step. We start with OPP and modify it to the server
password protocol (passwords for a user on a server and for a server on a user).
This simple protocol can be defeated by using a Phishing attack in conjunction
with a Man-In-The-Middle attack. Hence, we modify it and develop the Universal
Password Protocol UPP, which is adequate for the purpose of protecting passwords.
(It may be noted in passing that UPP also solves the problem of password reuse –
the user only has to remember one password for access to all secure sites, without
the problem of reusing a password at multiple servers.) However, we note that even
UPP can be beaten; a malicious server can simply log the user in, and steal other
secrets from her, when it fails to obtain her password. In answer to this problem, we
develop the Two-Way Password Protocol TPP and improve it to our final version,
the Dynamic Two-Way Password Protocol DTPP. DTPP ensures that all the secrets
shared between a user and a server – and in particular the user’s password on the
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server – are secure from Phishing attacks.
We begin with a detailed description of TLS and the current state of the art,
in the following Section.
4.1 Background
Before a user U can communicate with a secure website S over the web, both U
and S need to authenticate one another by executing two protocols: the standard
TLS protocol [27] which allows U to authenticate S, and a usual one-way password
protocol which allows S to authenticate U . For completeness, in this Section we
briefly review the standard TLS protocol.
A certificate of a website S is a data structure that has the following format:
(R,S,KS , t, sig)
where R is an issuer, S is a website, KS is a public key of S, t is an expiration date,
sig is a signature.
This certificate can be viewed as the statement “R asserts that the public key
of website S is KS , from now until date t.” When a user U receives this certificate,
U needs to perform two checks. First, U needs to check that the certificate is current
by checking that the expiration date t has not yet been reached. Second, U needs
to check that the certificate is valid by using the signature of the certificate, as
discussed below, to validate that R has indeed issued the certificate. If C concludes
that the certificate is both current and valid, then C accepts that KS is the public
key of S.
The signature of the certificate is computed by the issuer R as follows:
sig := K−1R < H(R,S,KS , t) >
where K−1R is the private key of R, H is a standard secure hash function, H(R,S,KS , t)
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is the result of applying the hash function H to the concatenation of the four items
R, S, KS , and t in the certificate, and K
−1
R < H(R,S,KS , t) > is the encryption of
H(R,S,KS , t) using the private key K
−1
R of issuer R.
When a client C receives this certificate, C needs to use the signature of the
certificate to validate that R issued the certificate. To perform this check, client C
needs to know a priori the public key KR of issuer R. (Public keys from trusted
Certification Authorities, for example Verisign, come pre-loaded with all browsers
in use today.) User C performs this check as follows:
1. Client C decrypts the signature of the received certificate using the public key
KR of issuer R.
2. Client C applies the secure hash function H to (the concatenation of) the four
fields R, S, KS , and t in the certificate.
3. If the values computed in the two previous steps are equal, then user C con-
cludes that R has indeed issued the received certificate. Otherwise, client C
concludes that R has not issued the certificate.
We will now present the execution of a simple scenario of the TLS protocol.
A client C and a server S are executing the protocol, using the certificate of S.
C → S : client-hello(nc)
C ← S : server-hello(ns),
certificate((R,S,KS , t, sig))
C → S : key-exchange(KS < pms >),
finished(H(nc, ns, pms,ms))
C ← S : finished(H(ns, nc, pms,ms))
where nc is a nonce selected at random by client C and sent in the clear to website
S, ns is a nonce selected at random by website S and sent in the clear to client
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C, pms is a premaster secret selected at random by client C and sent in private to
website S after it is encrypted by the public key KS of S, and ms is the master
secret computed by both client C and website S using the three values nc, ns, and
pms.
The key-exchange(KS < pms >) message, sent from C to S in the third
step of this scenario, is intended to challenge S, if it is indeed S, to use its private
key K−1S to decrypt the message, obtain the premaster secret pms, and use pms to
compute the master secret ms. When client C checks, in the fourth step, that S
was able to correctly compute ms, C knows that it is indeed communicating with
S.
The finished(H(nc, ns, pms,ms)) message, sent from C to S in the third
step of this scenario, is intended to assure website S that client C was able to com-
pute the master secret ms correctly. Similarly, the finished(H(ns, nc, pms,ms))
message, sent from S to C in the fourth step of this scenario, is intended to assure
client C that website S was able to compute ms correctly.
At the end of this execution, the following two outcomes are achieved.
1. Client C knows that it is indeed communicating with website S.
2. Both C and S agree on a master secret ms that they can use to encrypt and
decrypt all the messages that they need to exchange next.
Note that the authentication is not symmetric; server S does not know the
client with whom it is communicating. In order to make up for this shortcoming,
TLS is usually paired with a simple password protocol to authenticate client C to
server S.
Unfortunately, this arrangement is not adequate to provide security. In the
next Section, we show that despite the security provided by the TLS protocol, there
exist attacks that can circumvent the security provided by a combination of TLS
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with normal password authentication.
4.2 The One-Way Password Protocol
In this Section, we argue that the authentication procedure that is based on the
standard TLS protocol and the traditional one-way password protocol are vulnerable
to Phishing attacks.
After executing the TLS protocol as in Section 4.1, and in order for S to
know user U with whom it is communicating, U and S execute the following two
steps of the one-way password protocol. (Note that the messages exchanged in these
two steps are encrypted using the master secret ms that is computed in the TLS
protocol.)
U ← S : ms < enter (user id, password) >
U → S : ms < (U, pw) >
Prior to executing these two steps, user U has registered the pair (U,H(pw))
in website S where pw is a password of U . Thus, when S receives the message
ms < (U, pw) > from U , S concludes that it is indeed communicating with user U .
Clearly, OPP ensures that the user is authenticated to the server. TLS
ensures that the server is authenticated to the user’s browser; when the URL for
site S is displayed in the location bar of the browser, the user is indeed at site S.
However, the combination of OPP and TLS has one subtle weakness. Au-
thenticating the server to the user’s browser is not the same as authenticating the
server to the user. In fact, an adversary M can defeat this security measure simply
by not spoofing (i.e. M does not claim to be at the URL of server S) and using
other means to make the user U associate M with S.
We will now describe an example of a Phishing attack that can defeat the




A user U receives the following email:
“For being a good customer of the website https://www.ebay.com, we offer
you a special deal. Please log into the website https://www.specialdeals.
com to check out our great deal to you.”
From now on, we refer to the website https://www.ebay.com as website S,
and we refer to the website https://www.specialdeals.com as website M .
Excited by this email, user U proceeds to log into website M . First, the TLS
protocol is executed between client C of user U and website M so that U can be
certain that it is indeed communicating with M . Second, M sends to U the message
ms < enter (user id, password) >, but this message is displayed on a webpage that
has the same logo and graphics as that of website S. Third, user U enters into the
displayed webpage his user id U and his password pw, which U has registered earlier
in website S. Fourth, user U receives from website M a webpage that offers U to
purchase a good collection of DVDs for a cheap price and instructs U to enter his
credit card number if he is interested in purchasing this collection. Fifth, user U
decides to purchase the DVD collection and enters his credit card number into the
webpage.
Unfortunately for user U and website S, website M is not related in any way
to website S. (The fact is that sites S and M belong to different domains, as site S
belongs to the domain ebay.com and site M belongs to the domain specialdeals.
com, should have implied that these two sites are not related.) In fact, M is an
adversarial website that has just launched a successful Phishing attack against user
U and website S and obtained the pair (U, pw), which user U has registered earlier
in website M , along with the credit card number of user U .
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After obtaining this information, website M can launch two more attacks
against user U and website S.
1. A User Impersonation Attack:
Using the pair (U, pw), M can successfully log into website S pretending to
be user U .
2. An Identity Theft Attack:
Using the credit card number of U , M can purchase many items over the web.
This Phishing attack is successful because neither the TLS protocol nor the
one-way password protocol attempted to authenticate the fact that websites S and
M are related to one another.
4.3 The Server Password Protocol
In the previous Section, we see clearly that the standard practice (of using OPP and
TLS) can be broken by Phishing attacks. However, we note that the use of OPP in
conjunction with TLS does in fact ensure that the following two conditions hold:
1. The server is in fact the server whose address is currently displayed in the
user’s address bar.
2. The user is authenticated to the server.
The problem is that the server is not properly authenticated to the user; user U can
be sure that it is indeed communicating with server M , but has no way of knowing
whether M is in fact associated with server S with which U has a relationship of
trust.
We note that the user is properly authenticated to the server. This asymme-
try is caused by the fact that OPP checks to make sure that the user has the correct
password to log on to the server, but there is no corresponding check for the server.
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Based on the above observation, it is natural to ask whether simply making
the password protocol more symmetric would solve the problem. Just as the user is
authenticated to the server by knowledge of a password, the server is authenticated
to the user by knowledge of a secret called the server password. (For example, a
server password can be a unique image, a phrase etc.) The user stores the server
password on server S. In subsequent interaction, S authenticates itself to U by
sending U its server password.
We name this protocol the server password protocol, and show its working
below.
User U stores in website S the triplet:
(U, ps,H(pw))
where U is a user id, ps is a server password, and pw is a password of user U .
U ↔ S : execute TLS and compute ms
U ← S : ms < enter user id >
U → S : ms < U >
U ← S : ms < ps, enter password >
U → S : ms < pw >
Unfortunately, the attractive hypothesis that this protocol is robust against
Phishing attacks is incorrect. We demonstrate that a Phishing attack, combined
with a Man-In-The-Middle attack, succeeds in compromising the server password
protocol.
Phisherman in the Middle Attack:
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1. U ↔ M : execute TLS and compute ms
2. M ↔ S : execute TLS and compute ms′
3. M ← S : ms′ < enter user id >
4. U ← M : ms < enter user id >
5. U → M : ms < U >
6. M → S : ms′ < U >
7. M ← S : ms′ < ps, enter password >
8. U ← M : ms < ps, enter password >
9. U → M : ms < pw >
10. M → S : abort login procedure
11. U ← M : ms < enter credit card number >
12. U → M : ms < cc >
13. M : gets both password pw and credit card number cc
The reason for the insecurity of this protocol, is that both authentications (a
user to a server and a server to a user) do not happen simultaneously. At some step,
one party, the user or the server, has to take a “leap of faith” and go first, sending
its secret (password or server password, respectively) to the other party before it is
authenticated. In this case, it is the server that sends its server password to the user
before it has seen the user password; consequently, the adversary M can obtain the
server password from S and break the protocol, as shown above.
4.4 The Universal Password Protocol
In this section, we present a protocol, called the Universal Password Protocol, which
ensures that the password of U on S cannot be stolen by Phishing attacks. The
primary idea is that the user only has to remember one universal password; the
password for a server is generated when needed.
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User U stores in website S the triplet:
(U, ps,H(pw))
where U is a user id, ps is a server password, and the password pw is computed as
follows.
pw := H(upw, ds)
where H is a standard secure hash function, upw is the universal password of user
U , ds is the domain name of web site S (for example if S is the website https:
//www.amazon.com, then ds is amazon.com), and H(upw, ds) is the application of
function H to the concatenation of the universal password upw of user U , and the
domain name ds of server S.
The execution of the universal password protocol proceeds as follows:
U ↔ S : execute TLS and compute ms
U ← S : ms < enter user id >
U → S : ms < U >
U ← S : ms < ps, enter password >
U → S : ms < pw >
It may be noted that the user sends the server its password to authenticate
itself, but the server stores only the secure hash of the password. The reason for
this measure is to ensure that, even if the server is compromised – for example, by
disgruntled employees – and the store of hashed passwords is stolen, the attacker
cannot start using this database of stolen passwords to impersonate U .
We can now make a very interesting observation. As TLS prevents spoofing,
U knows the domain name of M , and will use dm rather than ds to compute the
password sent to server M ; consequently, M cannot learn the password of U on S
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by means of Phishing attacks.
However, this protocol, while perfectly adequate for the purpose of protecting
the password of U , does not serve to protect any other secrets shared between U
and S.
To see why, we consider the following subtle Phishing attack.
Persevering Phisherman Attack:
1. U ↔ M : execute TLS and compute ms
2. M ↔ S : execute TLS and compute ms′
3. M ← S : ms′ < enter user id >
4. U ← M : ms < enter user id >
5. U → M : ms < U >
6. M → S : ms′ < U >
7. M ← S : ms′ < ps, enter password >
8. U ← M : ms < ps, enter password >
9. U → M : ms < H(upw, dm) >
10. M → S : abort login procedure
11. U ← M : ms < enter credit card number >
12. U → M : ms < cc >
13. M : gets credit card number cc
On close observation, we see that the weakness in UPP is again due to the
problem that authentication of U to S and of S to U does not happen in a single
step, and consequently, there remains a possibility that the server password of S
can be stolen.
However, we have seen in UPP that, by incorporating the domain name ds
of server S into the password, we can protect the password from being stolen by the
adversary; M can get a password, but it will not get the password of U on S. It is
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natural to ask if the same idea, using ds in the server password of S, can protect
the server password from being stolen and used by M . We develop this idea in the
following section.
4.5 The Two-Way Password Protocol
In the previous Section, we demonstrated that while UPP is adequate for protecting
passwords, the security of a system using UPP can still be compromised by an
adversary using a more subtle attack, which we call Persevering Phisherman attack.
A secure session involves not only the password, but also other secrets; even if the
adversary M cannot acquire the password, it can acquire the other secrets shared
between U and S – such as the credit card number of U .
In this Section, we address this vulnerability to develop a more advanced
version of our protocol, which we call the Two-Way Password Protocol (TPP). This
protocol ensures that, unlike in UPP, the malicious server M cannot simply pass on
to U a server password from S. Thus, TPP (in conjunction with TLS to prevent
spoofing) protects not only the password, but also any other secrets shared between
U and S.
The fundamental insight behind this protocol is the fact that the hash of the
user’s password H(pw), stored on the server, can in fact itself be used as a server
password. In our exposition on UPP, we showed how password pw can be made
site-specific by incorporating the server domain name ds. By using H(pw) as the
server password of S, we make the server password domain-specific also. To authen-
ticate itself to U , the adversary server M needs to produce the corresponding server
password H2(upw, dm). But M cannot obtain this server password; its value is not
present on server S (because S stores H2(upw, ds), not H2(upw, dm)) and M cannot
calculate it without knowledge of upw (which U does not share). Hence we solve
the problem of the server M stealing the server password of S and authenticating
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itself to the user.
User U stores in website S the pair:
(U,H(pw))
where U is a user id, and pw is computed as discussed in UPP in the previous
Section.
pw := H(upw, ds)
U ↔ S : execute TLS and compute ms
U ← S : ms < enter user id >
U → S : ms < U >
U ← S : ms < H2(upw, ds), enter password >
U → S : ms < H(upw, ds) >
The Failure of Phishing Attacks:
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1. U ↔ M : execute TLS and compute ms
2. M ↔ S : execute TLS and compute ms′
3. M ← S : ms′ < enter user id >
4. U ← M : ms < enter user id >
5. U → M : ms < U >
6. M → S : ms′ < U >
7. M ← S : ms′ < H2(upw, ds),
enter password >
8. U ← M : The attack fails at this point
since M cannot compute
ms < H2(upw, dm) >
to send it to U
4.6 The Dynamic Two-Way Password Protocol
In the previous Section, we demonstrated TPP, which is secure against even sophis-
ticated Phishing attacks. For all practical purposes, TPP achieves our goal of being
immune to Phishing attacks.
However, unlike some advanced login protocols such as TLP [22], TPP does
not have the feature of one-time login data. In TLP, the login data needed to
authenticate U to S is updated on each login, so even if an adversary manages to
acquire the login data of U to S, the stolen data becomes useless after the next login
of U into S.
Under the assumption of secure TLS, the password is secure in TPP – it
is only sent to the authenticated server S, and is encrypted to make sure that it
cannot be stolen by an eavesdropping attack. However, in practice, there do exist
attacks that break the security assumptions of TLS; for example, the root certificate
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authorities accepted by browsers are not always trustworthy. A password protocol
cannot protect against such an attack (where TLS is broken and the attacker M
can spoof as S). However, in order to minimize the damage if even such an attack is
carried out, we incorporate into TPP the additional feature of one-time login data.
The secrets needed to authenticate U to S, and S to U , are updated on each login;
hence, even if the adversary does manage to steal the password of U , the stolen
password is only useful until the next time U logs into S. We call this final version
of our protocol the Dynamic Two-Way Password Protocol (DTPP).
User U stores in website S the triplet:
(U, ni, H(pwi))
where U is a user id, ni is (the i’th value of) a nonce chosen by the user, and pwi is
H(upw, ni, ds)
where upw is the universal password of user U and ds is the domain name of server S.
U ↔ S : execute TLS and compute ms
U ← S : ms < enter user id >
U → S : ms < U >
U ← S : ms < ni, H2(upw, ni, ds), enter password >
U → S : ms < H(upw, ni, ds), ni+1, H2(upw, ni+1, ds) >
We see that the working of the Dynamic Two-way password protocol (DTPP)
is almost exactly similar to that of the Two-way password protocol (TPP). The main
difference is that the password is some fixed pw, but pwi; it varies with each login.
Server S stores the last value of the nonce ni and the corresponding H(pwi).
When user U tries to log into, she is given her ni as well as the corresponding
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H(pwi). As U knows H,upw, ni, and ds, she can check that H(pwi) is correct, and
authenticate the server. Now she chooses the next value of the nonce to be ni+1.
In the last step, she sends to the server the password pwi = H(upw, ni, ds) (so user
is authenticated to server), and the pair ni+1 and H
2(upw, ni+1, ds), i.e. H(pwi+1).
S replaces the stored ni and H(pwi) with ni+1 and H(pwi+1); these values will be
used the next time a user tries to log in with user name U . Thus, the password and
server password change with every use in this protocol.
4.7 Related Work
Secure remote authentication of parties over the Internet is an extremely important
problem, and has been the focus of considerable research. In this section, we discuss
a few relevant protocols, and specify the contribution of this Chapter in the context
of earlier work.
As TPP is a password protocol, it is most natural to consider it in the context
of earlier password protocols. From the development of the protocol, it is clear that
the most interesting feature of TPP is its immunity to Phishing attacks, which break
ordinary password protocols, simple challenge-handshake authentication protocols
such as site key [10] and message digest protocols [37], and hash-based protocols [49].
However, TPP, thanks to its use of a universal password, has several other
highly desirable features. Early password protocols such as Lamport’s [75] and
Rubin’s [103] one-time password protocols are forced to use a list of passwords,
which the client uses one time only, to guard against the threat of eavesdropping
attacks. This, of course, leads to the serious inconvenience of having to remember
and register a huge list of passwords. On the other hand, protocols that depend
on one central server to authenticate clients for multiple servers [81] have a single
point of failure and require a high cost of integration. TPP circumvents all of these
problems; it ensures that login data is for one-time use only, but requires the user
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to remember only one (strong) password, and, unlike the Passpet system [122], does
not require any external server for authentication.
Another important feature of TPP is that it uses no exotic computation such
as modular exponentiations etc; the only required computation, (in addition to the
standard encryption/decryption done by TLS) is the computation of one secure hash
at the client and one at the server. Thus, it does not use any non-standard operations
or require much processing power, unlike other strong password protocols such as
EKE [12] and SRP [120]. Moreover, as it is built to be used in conjunction with
TLS, it benefits directly from improvements to TLS. For example, TLS is currently
being upgraded to use SRP as an underlying layer. This will improve the security
of TLS, and thus strengthen a system running TPP, as any such system also runs
TLS.
The closest ancestor to TPP is our own earlier protocol SPP [45]. However,
SPP is a single password protocol, whose aim is simply to safeguard the user’s
single (universal) password. Thus, SPP is vulnerable to subtle attacks that try to
steal other secrets besides the user’s password (such as the Persevering Phisherman
attack). TPP provides complete protection of all secrets from Phishing attacks.
4.8 Concluding Remarks
Standard authentication over the web, using TLS and a password protocol, is easily
compromised by user error and Phishing attacks. In this Chapter, we present a
strong protocol, UPP, which ensures that the user’s password cannot be compro-
mised. Next, building on UPP, we develop TPP and finally DTPP, a password
protocol which (in conjunction with TLS) provides mutual authentication between
client and server, and protects all shared secrets between client and server from
Phishing attacks. It may be noted that this protocol is fairly lightweight; it takes
only four messages (the original password protocol itself takes two), and imposes
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little additional computational or storage load on the client or on the server. We
suggest that, given the widespread prevalence of Phishing attacks [114], there is
good reason to deploy the TPP protocol and replace the one-way passwords that




Protocol in Sensor Networks
Many sensor networks (especially networks of mobile sensors or networks that are
deployed to monitor crisis situations) are deployed in an arbitrary and unplanned
fashion. Thus, any sensor in such a network can end up being adjacent to any
other sensor in the network. To secure the communications between every pair of
adjacent sensors in such a network, each sensor x in the network needs to store n−1
symmetric keys that sensor x shares with all the other sensors, where n is an upper
bound on the number of sensors in the network. This storage requirement of the
keying protocol is rather severe, especially when n is large and the available storage
in each sensor is modest. Earlier efforts to redesign this keying protocol and reduce
the number of keys to be stored in each sensor have produced protocols that are
vulnerable to impersonation, eavesdropping, and collusion attacks. In this Chapter,
we present a fully secure keying protocol where each sensor needs to store (n+ 1)/2
keys, which is much less than the n−1 keys that need to be stored in each sensor in
the original keying protocol. We also show that in any fully secure keying protocol,
each sensor needs to store at least (n − 1)/2 keys. Our keying protocol to store
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(n + 1)/2 is the best possible secure protocol and was published in [18].
Many wireless sensor networks are deployed in arbitrary and unplanned fash-
ion. Examples of such networks are networks of mobile sensors [56] and networks
that are deployed in a hurry to monitor evolving crisis situations [105] or continu-
ously changing battlefields [57].
In any such network, any deployed sensor can end up being adjacent to any
other deployed sensor. Thus, each pair of sensors, say sensors x and y, in the
network need to share a symmetric key, denoted Kx,y, that can be used to secure
the communication between sensors x and y if these two sensors happen to be
deployed adjacent to one another. In particular, if sensors x and y become adjacent
to one another, then these two sensors can use their shared symmetric key Kx,y to
authenticate one another (i.e. defend against impersonation) and to encrypt and
decrypt their exchanged data messages (i.e. defend against eavesdropping).
It follows from this discussion that each sensor x in such a network is required
to store n−1 symmetric keys, where n is the total number of sensors in the network
and each stored key is shared between sensor x and a different sensor in the network.
This requirement that each sensor in the network stores n−1 symmetric keys, where
n is the number of sensors in the network, is rather severe especially when n is large
and the available storage to store keys in every sensor is modest.
This situation raises the following important questions: Is it possible to
design a keying protocol, where each sensor stores less than n−1 symmetric keys and
yet the protocol is deterministically secure against impersonation, eavesdropping,
and collusion?
In this Chapter, we show that the answer to this question is “Yes.” In par-
ticular, we present a new keying protocol where each sensor stores only (n + 1)/2
symmetric keys, and yet the protocol is deterministically secure against imperson-
ation, eavesdropping, and collusion. We also show that this new protocol is near
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optimal by showing that each sensor, in any keying protocol that is deterministically
secure against impersonation, eavesdropping, and collusion, needs to store at least
(n− 1)/2 symmetric keys.
5.1 Sensor Networks and Adversaries
In this Chapter, we investigate a sensor network whose topology is not planned
in advance, prior to the deployment of the network. Thus, when the network is
deployed, any sensor can end up being adjacent to any other sensor in the network.
There are many occasions when a sensor network needs to be deployed before
its topology can be planned in great detail. For example, when a wildfire breaks out
unexpectedly, a sensor network that monitors the fire may need to be deployed in a
hurry, before the network topology can be planned accurately. A second example,
when a sensor network is deployed in a battlefield whose perimeter is continuously
changing, the topology of the network cannot be determined fully until the time
when the network is to be deployed. As a third example, if the deployed sensor
network is mobile, then a detailed plan of the initial topology may be of little value.
In this network, when a sensor x is deployed, it first attempts to identify
the identity of each sensor adjacent to x, then starts to exchange data with each of
those adjacent sensors.
Any sensor z in this network can be an “adversary”, and can attempt to
disrupt the communication between any two legitimate sensors, say sensors x and
y, by launching the following two attacks:
1. Impersonation Attack: Sensor z notices that it is adjacent to sensor x while
sensor y is not. Thus, sensor z attempts to convince sensor x that it (z) is in
fact sensor y. If sensor z succeeds, then sensor x may start to exchange data
messages with sensor z, thinking that it is communicating with sensor y.
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2. Eavesdropping Attack: Sensor z notices that it is adjacent to both sensors
x and y, and that sensors x and y are adjacent to one another. Thus, when
sensors x and y start to exchange data messages, sensor z can copy each
exchanged data message between x and y.
To defend against these two types of attacks, sensors x and y need to share
a symmetric key, denoted Kx,y or Ky,x. The shared key Kx,y needs to be known
only to both sensors x and y, and not to any other sensor in the network, before
these two sensors are deployed in the network. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below, we
show how sensors x and y can use their shared key Kx,y to defend against these two
types of attacks.
5.2 Keying Protocols for Sensor Networks
A keying protocol for a sensor network is a scheme for assigning a unique symmetric
key Kx,y to each pair of distinct sensors x and y in the network. Each symmetric
key Kx,y, that is assigned by the keying protocol, becomes known only to sensors x
and y (and not to any other sensor in the network) before the network is deployed
and before the adjacent sensors in the deployed network start to communicate with
one another.
It follows from this discussion that if a sensor network has at most n sensors,
then each sensor in the network needs to know at most (n − 1) distinct symmetric
keys – one key Kx,y for every other sensor y in the network – before the network is
deployed.
There are two ways for a sensor x to know a symmetric key Kx,y (before the
network is deployed):
1. Storage:
Key Kx,y is stored in sensor x
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2. Computation:
Sensor x stores a constant kx that it can use to compute key Kx,y as follows:
Kx,y := F (iy, kx)
where
F is a public function that is known to every sensor in the network
iy is the identity of sensor y
kx is a constant that is stored in sensor x
The cost of a keying protocol for a sensor network is measured by the number
of symmetric keys (say Kx,y) plus the number of constants (say kx) that this keying
protocol requires every x to store before the network is deployed.
Note that the cost of the straightforward keying protocol, which requires
that every sensor x stores (n− 1) symmetric keys (of the form Kx,y), where n is the
upper bound on the number of sensors in the network, is (n− 1).
In this Chapter, we address the following question. Is there a keying protocol
for a sensor network, whose cost is much less than (n − 1), where n is the upper
bound on the number of sensors in the network? Our research ends up with the
following two results.
(a) Efficiency:
There is a keying protocol, where each sensor shares a distinct symmetric key
with every other sensor in the network, and whose cost is (n + 1)/2.
(b) Optimality:
The cost of every keying protocol, where each sensor shares a distinct symmetric
key with every other sensor in the network, is at least (n− 1)/2.
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In the next Section, we present a keying protocol whose cost is (n + 1)/2,
which is half the cost of the straightforward keying protocol.
5.3 An Efficient Keying Protocol
Let n denote an upper bound on the number of sensors in our network. Without
loss of generality, we assume that n is an odd positive integer. Each sensor in the
network has a unique identifier in the range 0 . . . n− 1. We use ix and iy to denote
the identifiers of sensors x and y, respectively, in this network.
Two sensors, say sensors x and y, share a symmetric key denoted Kx,y or
Ky,x. Only the two sensors x and y know their shared key Kx,y. And if sensors x and
y ever become neighbors in the network, then they can use their shared symmetric
key Kx,y to perform two functions:
1. Mutual Authentication: Sensor x authenticates sensor y, and sensor y
authenticates sensor x.
2. Confidential Data Exchange: Encrypt and later decrypt all the exchanged
data messages between x and y.
(Note that sensors x and y can become neighbors in the network in two cases.
First, the two sensors x and y could be mobile and their movements cause them to
become adjacent to one another. Second, the two sensors could be stationary and
they are deployed adjacent to one another.)
In the remainder of this Section, we show that if the shared symmetric keys
are designed to have a “special structure,” then each sensor needs to store only
(n + 1)/2 shared symmetric keys. But before we present the special structure of
the shared keys, we need to introduce two new concepts: universal keys and an
asymmetric relation, named below, over the sensor identifiers.
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Each sensor x in the network stores a symmetric key, called the universal key
of sensor x. The universal key of sensor x, denoted ux, is known only to sensor x.
Let ix and iy be two distinct sensor identifiers. (Recall that both ix and
iy are in the range 0 . . . n − 1, where n is the (odd) upper bound of the number
of sensors in the sensor network.) Identifier ix is said to be below identifier iy iff
exactly one of the following two conditions holds:
1. ix < iy and (iy − ix) < n/2
2. ix > iy and (ix− iy) > n/2
The below relation is better explained by an example. Consider the case
where n = 5. In this case, the sensor identifiers s are 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, and we have:
• Identifier 0 is below identifiers 1 and 2.
• Identifier 1 is below identifiers 2 and 3.
• Identifier 2 is below identifiers 3 and 4.
• Identifier 3 is below identifiers 4 and 0.
• Identifier 4 is below identifiers 0 and 1.
The next three Theorems, concerning the below relation, are in order.
Theorem 1. For any two distinct sensor identifiers ix and iy, one of the following
two statements is true.
1. ix is below iy.
2. iy is below ix.
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Proof. Let ix and iy be any two distinct sensor identifiers. Thus, ix and iy are two
distinct integers in the range 0 . . . (n − 1). Without loss of generality, assume that
ix < iy. Because n is an odd integer, exactly one of the following two statements
holds.
(1) iy − ix < n/2
(2) iy − ix > n/2
If statement (1) holds then ix is below iy. Otherwise statement (2) holds and iy is
below ix.
Theorem 2. For each sensor identifier ix, the number of distinct sensor identifiers
iy, where ix is below iy, is (n− 1)/2.
Proof. Each of the following (n − 1)/2 sensor identifiers is below ix: (ix − 1)
mod n, (ix − 2) mod n, . . . , (ix − n−12 ) mod n. Also, ix is below each of the fol-
lowing (n− 1)/2 sensor identifiers: (ix+ 1) mod n, (ix+ 2) mod n, . . . , (ix+ n−12 )
mod n. Thus, the number of distinct sensor identifiers iy, where iy is below ix, is
(n− 1)/2. Also, the number of distinct sensor identifiers iy, where ix is below iy, is
(n− 1)/2.
Theorem 3. For each sensor identifier ix, the number of distinct sensor identifiers
iy, where iy is below ix, is (n− 1)/2.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.
The special structure of the symmetric key Kx,y, in the case where ix is below




H is a secure hash function
| is the concatenation operator
ix is the identifier of sensor x
uy is the universal key of sensor y
Note that in this case (where ix is below iy), the symmetric key Kx,y needs
to be stored in sensor x only since sensor y can compute this key (using H, |, ix,
and uy) whenever it needs it.
Note also that in the other case, where iy is below ix, the special structure
of the symmetric key Kx,y is H(iy|ux). And in this case, Kx,y needs to be stored in
sensor y only since sensor x can compute this key whenever it needs it.
The correctness of this keying protocol follows from the next Theorem.
Theorem 4. If a sensor identifier ix is below a sensor identifier iy, then the sym-
metric key Kx,y = H(ix|uy) is stored in sensor x and can be computed by sensor y
when needed. No other sensor stores Kx,y or can compute it.
Proof. Assume that a sensor identifier ix is below a sensor identifier iy. By our
keying protocol the symmetric key that is shared between sensors x and y, namely
H(ix|uy), is stored in sensor x only. Moreover, because sensor y is the only one that
knows the universal key uy, only sensor y can compute the key H(ix|uy).
The efficiency of the keying protocol follows from the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. Each sensor x stores one universal key ux and (n − 1)/2 symmetric
keys Kx,y for every sensor y, where ix is below iy.
Proof. According to the above keying protocol, each sensor x stores its universal key
ux. Also, each sensor x stores the symmetric keys Kx,y that sensor x shares with
every sensor y where ix is below iy. From Theorem 2, there are (n− 1)/2 sensors y
where ix is below iy. Therefore, each sensor x stores (n− 1)/2 symmetric keys.
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5.4 A Mutual Authentication Protocol
Before the sensors are deployed in a network, each sensor x is supplied with the
following items:
1. One distinct identifier ix in the range 0 . . . n− 1
2. One universal key ux
3. (n − 1)/2 symmetric keys Kx,y = H(ix|uy) each of which is shared between
sensor x and another sensor y, where ix is below iy
After every sensor is supplied with these items, the sensors are deployed in
random locations in the network.
Now if two sensors x and y happen to become adjacent to one another, then
these two sensors need to execute a mutual authentication protocol so that sensor
x proves to sensor y that it is indeed sensor x and sensor y proves to sensor x that
it is indeed sensor y.
The mutual authentication protocol consists of the following six steps.
Step 1: Sensor x selects a random nonce nx and sends a hello message that is
received by sensor y.
x→ y : hello(ix, nx)
Step 2: Sensor y selects a random nonce ny and sends a hello message that is
received by sensor x.
x← y : hello(iy, ny)
Step 3: Sensor x determines whether ix is below iy. Then it either fetches Kx,y
from its memory or computes it. Finally, sensor x sends a verify message to sensor
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y.
x→ y : verify(ix, iy,H(ix|iy|ny|Kx,y))
Step 4: Sensor y determines whether iy is below ix. Then it either fetches Kx,y
from its memory or computes it. Finally, sensor y sends a verify message to sensor
x.
x← y : verify(iy, ix,H(iy|ix|nx|Kx,y))
Step 5: Sensor x computes H(iy|ix|nx|Kx,y) and compares it with the received
H(iy|ix|nx|Kx,y). If they are equal, then x concludes that the sensor claiming to
be sensor y is indeed sensor y. Otherwise, no conclusion can be reached.
Step 6: Sensor y computes H(ix|iy|ny|Kx,y) and compares it with the received
H(ix|iy|ny|Kx,y). If they are equal, then y concludes that the sensor claiming to be
sensor x is indeed sensor x. Otherwise, no conclusion can be reached.
Next, we describe how this mutual authentication protocol defends against
two types of attacks, impersonation attacks and Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
1) Defending against Impersonation Attacks:
An impersonation attack by an adversary sensor z against the mutual au-
thentication protocol can proceed as follows:
z → y : hello(ix, nz)
z ← y : hello(iy, ny)
z → y : verify(ix, iy,H(. . .))
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Note that in this attack, sensor z impersonates sensor x as it executes the
mutual authentication protocol with sensor y. Fortunately, the computed term
H(. . .) in the last verify message is incorrect for two reasons:
1. z does not know Kx,y.
2. z cannot replay an old verify message from x to y because the H in the replayed
message does not have the correct nonce ny that was selected at random by
sensor y in the second step of the protocol.
Thus, y cannot conclude that it is communicating with x and abandons the
authentication protocol.
2) Defending against Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: A Man-in-the-Middle at-
tack by an adversary sensor z against the mutual authentication protocol can pro-
ceed as follows:
x→ z : hello(ix, nx)
z → y : hello(ix, nx)
z ← y : hello(iy, ny)
x← z : hello(iy, ny)
x→ z : verify(ix, iy,H(ix|iy|ny|Kx,y))
z → y : verify(ix, iy,H(ix|iy|ny|Kx,y))
z ← y : verify(iy, ix,H(iy|ix|nx|Kx,y))
x← z : verify(iy, ix,H(iy|ix|nx|Kx,y))
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Note that in this attack, sensor z acts as a perfect medium relaying each
message that it receives from sensor x to sensor y, and relaying each message that
it receives from sensor y to sensor x. But in this case, the authentication protocol
succeeds as it should, and the adversary sensor z does not gain any advantage by
launching this attack.
5.5 A Data Exchange Protocol
After two adjacent sensors x and y have authenticated one another using the mutual
authentication protocol described in the previous Section, sensors x and y can now
start exchanging data messages according to the following data exchange protocol.
(Recall that nx and ny are the two nonces that were selected at random by sensors
x and y, respectively, in the mutual authentication protocol.)
Step 1: Sensor x concatenates the nonce ny with the text of the data message to
be sent, encrypts the concatenation using the symmetric key Kx,y, and sends the
result in a data message to sensor y.
x→ y : data(ix, iy,Kx,y(ny|text))
Step 2: Sensor y concatenates the nonce nx with the text of the data message to
be sent, encrypts the concatenation using the symmetric key Kx,y, and sends the
result in a data message to sensor x.
x← y : data(iy, ix,Kx,y(nx|text))
Sensors x and y can repeat Steps 1 and 2 any number of times to exchange
data between themselves.
Next, we describe how this data exchange protocol defends against two types
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of attacks, eavesdropping attacks and replay attacks.
1) Defending against Eavesdropping Attacks:
An eavesdropping attack by an adversary sensor z against the data exchange pro-
tocol can proceed as follows:
x→ y, z : data(ix, iy,Kx,y(ny|text))
x, z ← y : data(iy, ix,Kx,y(nx|text))
In this attack, sensor z eavesdrops on the communication between x and y.
However, sensor z cannot understand the text of the messages between x and y
because this text is encrypted by using Kx,y shared only between x and y.
2) Defending against Replay Attacks:
A replay attack by an adversary sensor z against the data exchange protocol can
proceed as follows:
z → y : data(ix, iy,Kx,y(ny′|text))
x← z : data(iy, ix,Kx,y(nx′|text))
In this attack, the adversary sensor z waits until a new session, identified by
the pair of nonces (nx, ny), is established between sensors x and y. Then sensor z
starts to replay old data messages that were sent in an earlier session, identified by
the pair of nonces (nx, ny), between x and y. But the replayed messages will be
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discarded, and the attack will fail, because the intended receivers of the messages
expect to find nx or ny, instead of nx′ or ny′, in these messages.
5.6 Optimality of Our Keying Protocol
According to our keying protocol, described in Section 5.3, each sensor in the net-
work is required to store only (n + 1)/2 keys. Thus, the total number of keys that
need to be stored in the sensor network is n(n + 1)/2. (This is much better than
storing n(n−1) keys in the sensor network as dictated by the straightforward keying
protocol.)
Despite the big saving in storage, that is achieved by our keying protocol,
one wonders “Is there another keying protocol that requires the network to store
much less than n(n + 1)/2 keys?” The following theorem indicates that the answer
to this question is “No”.
Theorem 6. Each keying protocol, that is collusion-proof, requires the sensor net-
work to store at least n(n− 1)/2 keys.
Proof. In order for a keying protocol to be collusion-proof, the sensor network needs
to have n(n−1)/2 distinct symmetric keys. Thus, to prove that this theorem holds,
it is sufficient to prove that every one of those symmetric keys, say Kx,y, causes a
distinct key to be stored in sensor x or in sensor y. We carry out this proof by
contradiction.
Assume that some symmetric key Kx,y does not cause a distinct key to be
stored either in sensor x or in sensor y. In this case, sensor x stores a key kx that x
can use to compute at least two symmetric shared keys Kx,y and Kw,x as follows.
Kx,y = F (iy, kx) (5.1)
110
Kw,x = F (iw, kx) (5.2)
where F is a well-known function that can be used by each sensor to compute
its shared keys from its stored keys.
Similarly, sensor y stores a key ky that y can use to compute at least two
symmetric shared keys Kx,y and Ky,z as follows.
Kx,y = F (ix, ky) (5.3)
Ky,z = F (iz, ky) (5.4)
From 5.1 and 5.3 above, we have
F (iy, kx) = F (ix, ky) (5.5)
Sensor x should not be allowed to utilize 5.5 and deduce key ky (in order
that x be prevented from computing the shared key Ky,z). Therefore, there should
not be any effectively computable function F ′, such that
F ′(ix, F (ix, ky)) = ky (5.6)
Similarly, sensor y should not be allowed to utilize 5.5 and deduce key kx (in
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order that y be prevented from computing the shared key Kw,x). Therefore, there
should not be any effectively computable function F ′′, such that
F ′′(iy, F (iy, kx)) = kx (5.7)
From 5.6 and 5.7, we conclude the following.
(i) Because there is no effectively computable function F ′ that satisfies 5.6, there
is no effective way to compute key ky in sensor y from key kx in sensor x
before the two sensors x and y are deployed in the network.
(ii) Because there is no effectively computable function F ′′ that satisfies 5.7, there
is no effective way to compute key kx in sensor x from key ky in sensor y before
the two sensors x and y are deployed in the network.
From (i) and (ii), we conclude that the two secrets kx and ky cannot be
computed and stored in sensors x and y respectively before these two sensors are
deployed in the network. Contradiction!
A keying protocol is called uniform iff this protocol requires each sensor in
the network to store the same number of keys. Notice that the keying protocol
described in Section 5.3 is uniform. Notice also that the next Theorem, concerning
uniform keying protocols, follows from Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. Each uniform keying protocol requires each sensor in the network to
store at least (n− 1)/2 keys.
From Theorem 7, our keying protocol requires each process to store no more
than one key beyond the number of keys that need to be stored in each process by
the best uniform keying protocol. Thus, for all practical purposes, our protocol is
the best uniform keying protocol for sensor networks.
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5.7 Sensor Roles
There are two problems with our keying protocol, described in Section 5.3, of sensor
networks.
1. This keying protocol requires that each sensor in the network stores (n+ 1)/2
symmetric keys, where n is an upper bound on the number of sensors in
the network. Unfortunately, this number of symmetric keys (to be stored in
each sensors), is still large in those cases when n is large. To make matters
worse, we also showed that no keying protocol can require each sensor to store
less than (n + 1)/2 symmetric keys. (Luckily, this negative result depends
on the fact that the architecture of the sensor network is as described in
Section 5.1. And we show in this Section that if the network architecture is
changed from that described in Section 5.1, one can design a keying protocol
for the sensor network where each sensor is required to store much less than
(n + 1)/2 symmetric keys.)
2. If a sensor network, where each sensor stores (n + 1)/2 keys, is deployed, and
if later the number of sensors in the network to be increased beyond the upper
bound n, the keys that are already stored in each deployed sensor need to be
changed.
To solve these two problems, we introduce the concept of a “sensor role” as
follows.
Each sensor in a sensor network has a role. The role of a sensor can describe
the task that this sensor performs (e.g. sensing temperature or sensing motion).
It can also describe the general location of the sensor (e.g. the second floor or the
third floor of the building being sensed).
Many sensors in a sensor network can have the same role in order to provide
fault-tolerance and accurate sensing. For example, a sensor network can have some
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fifty sensors whose role is to sense temperature in the third floor of the building
being sensed. These sensors can provide fault-tolerance and accurate sensing of the
temperature in the third floor of the building.
If follows from this discussion that an upper bound m on the number of
distinct roles in the network is relatively small whereas an upper bound n on the
number of sensors in the same network is relatively large.
Now, the symmetric keys, in a sensor network whose sensors have roles, can
be modified as follows. For every two roles f and g in the network, the network has
a distinct symmetric key Kf,g. Only sensors, whose role is f or g, know Kf,g and
no other sensor in the network knows Kf,g.
To realize the symmetric keys Kf,g, we modify the above keying protocol as
follows.
i. Each sensor whose role is f has an identifier if in the range 0 . . .m−1 where m
is an upper bound on the number of distinct roles in the network. (This means
that all sensors, whose role is f , have the same identifier if .)
ii. Each sensor whose role is f has a universal key uf (this means that all sensors,
whose role is f , have the same universal key uf .)
iii. For any two roles f and g, the symmetric key Kf,g is computed as follows
(depending on whether if is below ig, or ig is below if , or if = ig).
Case 1. (if is below ig):
Kf,g = H(if |ug)
In this case, every sensor whose role is if stores Kf,g and every sensor
whose role is ig computes Kf,g.
Case 2. (ig is below if):
Kf,g = H(ig|uf)
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In this case, every sensor whose role is ig stores Kf,g and every sensor
whose role is if computes Kf,g.
Case 3. (if = ig):
Kf,f = H(if |uf)
In this case, every sensor whose role is if computes Kf,f .
Therefore, every sensor in the network, where sensors have roles, stores (m+
1)/2 symmetric keys, where m is an upper bound on the number of roles in the
network.
5.8 Related Work
There are two main keying protocols that were proposed in the past to reduce the
number of stored keys in each sensor in the network. We refer to these two protocols
as the probabilistic keying protocol and the grid keying protocol.
In the probabilistic keying protocol [33], each sensor in the network stores a
small number of keys that are selected at random from a large set of keys. When two
adjacent sensors need to exchange data messages, the two sensors identify which keys
they have in common, then use a combination of their common keys as a symmetric
key to encrypt and decrypt their exchanged data messages. Clearly, this protocol
can probabilistically defend against eavesdropping.
Unfortunately, the probabilistic keying protocol suffers from the following
problem. The stored keys in any sensor x are independent of the identity of sensor
x and so these keys cannot be used to authenticate sensor x to any other sensor
in the network. In other word, the probabilistic protocol cannot defend against
impersonation.
In the grid keying protocol [44], [74], [3], and [31], each sensor is assigned an
identifier which is the coordinates of a distinct node in a two-dimensional grid. Also
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each symmetric key is assigned an identifier which is the coordinates of a distinct
node in two-dimensional grid. Then a sensor x stores a symmetric key K iff the
identifiers of x and K satisfy certain given relation. When two adjacent sensors need
to exchange data messages, the two sensors identify which keys they have in common
then use a combination of their common keys as a symmetric key to encrypt and
decrypt their exchanged data messages.
The grid keying protocol has two advantages (over the probabilistic proto-
col). First, this protocol can defend against impersonation (unlike the probabilistic
protocol) and can defend against eavesdropping (like the probabilistic protocol).
Second, each sensor in this protocol needs to store only O(log n) symmetric keys,
where n is an upper bound on the number of sensors in the network.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the grid keying protocol is vulnerable to
collusion. Specifically, a small gang of adversarial sensors in the network can pool
their stored keys together and use the pooled keys to decrypt all the exchanged data
messages in the sensor network.
5.9 Concluding Remarks
Typically, each sensor in a sensor network with n sensors needs to store n−1 distinct
(in order to ensure that the keying protocol is collusion-proof) shared symmetric keys
to communicate securely with each other. Thus, the number of shared symmetric
keys stored in the sensor network is n(n − 1). However, the optimal number of






Although there have been many approaches that attempt to reduce the number of
shared symmetric keys, they lead to a loss of security: they are all vulnerable to
collusion. In this Chapter, we show the best keying protocol for sensor networks, that
needs to store only (n+ 1)/2 shared symmetric keys to each sensor. The number of
shared symmetric keys stored in a sensor network with n sensors is n(n+1)/2, which
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is close to the optimal number of shared symmetric keys for any key distribution
scheme that is not vulnerable to collusion.
It may be noted that in addition to the low number of keys stored, and
the ability to resist collusion between sensors, our keying protocol has two further
advantages. First, it is uniform: we store the same number of keys in each sensor.
Second, it is computationally cheap, and thus suitable for a low-power computer
such as a sensor: when two sensors are adjacent to each other, the computation of a
shared symmetric key requires only hashing, which is a cheap computation and can
be done quickly. As our protocol has many desirable properties, such as efficiency,




ITY: Authentication in a
Network without Identities
Most networks require that their users have “identities,” i.e. have names that are
fixed for a relatively long time, unique, and have been approved by a central author-
ity (in order to guarantee their uniqueness). Unfortunately, this requirement, which
was introduced to simplify the design of networks, has its own drawbacks. First,
this requirement can lead to the loss of anonymity of communicating users. Second,
it can allow the possibility of identity theft. Third, it can lead some users to trust
other users who may not be trustworthy. In this Chapter, we argue that networks
can be designed without user identities and their drawbacks. Our argument con-
sists of providing answers to the following three questions. (1) How can one design
a practical network where users do not have identities? (2) What does it mean for
a user to authenticate another user in a network without identities? (3) How can
one design a secure authentication protocol in a network without identities? We
answered these three questions and published our results in [19].
Almost every network is designed under the assumption that each network
user is assigned an identity, which is a name that satisfies three conditions:
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i. Fixed: Once an identity is assigned to a network user, then this identity
remains assigned to this user for a relatively long time, measured in months,
years, or decades, even if this user decides to quit the network and no longer
communicate with other users.
ii. Unique: The identity assigned to a network user is distinct from that assigned
to any other network user.
iii. Approved by a Central Authority: The network has a central authority that
generates or at least approves the identities assigned to all network users.
This authority guarantees that (among other things) the identities assigned to
distinct network users are distinct.
The first condition, fixed identity, needs some explanation. Assume that a
user x in a network is assigned an identity idx. Thus, when each other user in
the network needs to send a message to user x, this other user needs to name idx.
Assume also that user x quits the network and its now available identity idx is
assigned to another user y in the network. Now if some user z, who is not yet aware
that user x has left the network, decides to send a message to user x and names
idx, then the network delivers the sent message to the wrong user y (instead of
discarding the message after recognizing that the intended message receiver has left
the network). We conclude from this scenario that when a user leaves the network,
its identity should be retired and not assigned to another user, at least for a relatively
long time.
Some examples of user identities are as follows. The identity of a user phone
in a phone network is the phone number that is assigned to this phone. The identity
of a user computer in an IP network (in the Internet) is the IP address of this
computer. Also, the identity of a user website in the World Wide Web is the URL
assigned to this site.
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The identities assigned to the users of a network play an important role in
the execution of the network:
1. User Identification: When a user x wants to communicate with another user
y, user x needs to supply the network with the identities of x and y so that
the network can compute the best route for routing the exchanged messages
between users x and y.
2. User Authentication: Any user x can be provided with a certificate that x can
later use to prove to any other user that it is indeed user x. The certificate,
provided to user x, has several items including the identity of user x and the
public key of user x.
3. User Reputation: An identity is assigned to a network user for a relatively
long time, and during this time, the reputation of this user, good or bad,
can develop and take hold among other network users. Thus, each network
can have “reputation systems” for recording and querying the reputations of
network users. Note that these reputation systems cannot be developed unless
the network users have unique and fixed identities.
Unfortunately, the adoption of user identities in a network does create some
security holes in that network:
a. Anonymity Loss: Each message that is exchanged between users x and y needs
to carry the identities of x and y in the clear in order to facilitate the routing
of the message between x and y. Thus any user, that can observe this message
while the message is in transit between x and y, can conclude correctly that
users x and y are currently in communication (even if the message contents
are encrypted).
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b. Identity Theft: In communications that do not require strong user authenti-
cation, any user x, who happens to know the identity of another user y, can
pretend to be user y while it communicates with a third user z.
c. Misplaced Trust: As mentioned above, the existence of user identities can
facilitate the development of reputation systems. However, the data stored in
some reputation systems can be corrupted, for example to indicate that some
user x can be trusted whereas in fact user x is not trustworthy.
There are two approaches to address the security holes that are created by
adopting user identities in a network. In the first approach, one develops techniques
to defend against each one of these holes. For example, to defend against iden-
tity theft, one may require that each communication between any two users in the
network should be preceded by strong mutual authentication.
In the second approach, one decides to design their network without (unique
and fixed) user identities. In this case, the designed network will not have any of
security holes that may be created by adopting user identifiers.
In this Chapter, we follow this second approach (simply because we believe
that no one has attempted to follow this approach before), and attempt to answer
the following three challenging questions:
i. How can one design a network without user identities?
ii. What does it mean for a user to authenticate another in such a network?
iii. How can one facilitate one user to authenticate another in such a network?
In the next Section, we answer the first question by outlining the architecture
of a network that does not have user identifiers.
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6.1 A Network without Identities
In this Section, we describe the architecture of a network where users do not have
identities. In this network, instead of an identity, each user x has an address, denoted
adx, and a nonempty set of pseudonyms, denoted NMx. The value of the address
adx and the contents of the set NMx satisfy the following three conditions:
i. Not Necessarily Fixed: At any instant, each user x can change the value of
its address adx or the contents of its pseudonym set NMx.
ii. Unique: The value of adx for a user x is not equal to the value of ady for any
other user y. Also, the contents of set NMx for user x are disjoint from the
contents of set NMy for user y.
iii. Approved by a Central Authority: Only user x can request that the value of its
address adx and the contents of its pseudonym set NMx be changed. However,
the network acts as a central authority, and declines any part of the request
that violates the above uniqueness condition. For example, if user x requests
that the value of its address adx be changed to a value that is currently being
claimed for address ady for another user y, then the network will decline the
request of user x.
Notice that the first condition, that adx and NMx are required to satisfy, is
the opposite of the first condition that an identity of user x is required to satisfy.
This shows that adx and NMx do not constitute an identity of user x.
With adx and NMx, we design the three protocols: (1) registration protocol
(2) connection protocol (3) authentication protocol. In the registration protocol,
each user sends a registration message to the network every T seconds. In the
connection protocol, a user x sends a request message to the network requesting to
be connected to another user y, and the network replies by sending reply messages to
both x and y informing them that they have been connected. In the authentication
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protocol, two connected users exchange and verify their tokens in order to check
whether they had communicated earlier. We discuss these three protocols in detail
in the following three Sections.
The value of address adx indicates a physical location where user x can receive
messages. Thus when some user y wants to send a message to user x, user y sends
the message to adx. Each pseudonym nmx in the pseudonym set NMx of user x is
meant to identify user x in one connection with another user in the network.
Because at any time each user x can update the value of its address adx and
the contents of its pseudonym set NMx, user x needs to register in the network,
every T seconds, the current value of adx and the current contents of NMx. Thus,
every T seconds, user x sends to the network a registration message that contains
the current value of adx and the current contents of NMx. The network maintains
a registration table where it stores the latest registered address adx and the latest
registered pseudonym set NMx for each user x in the network.
When a user x with pseudonym nmx wants to communicate with another
user y with a pseudonym nmy, user x sends a request message, that contains adx,
nmx, and nmy to the network. Then the network searches in its registration table for
a user y with pseudonym nmy. If the network finds no such user y in the registration
table, the network rejects the request. If the network finds (exactly) one such user
in the registration table, the network connects x to this user y.
Next, the network computes a symmetric connection key CK and sends reply
messages to both users x and y. The reply message to user x contains adx, nmx, ady,
nmy, and the connection key CK. The reply message to user y contains adx, nmx,
ady, nmy, and CK. When users x and y receive their respective reply messages
from the network, they can start exchanging messages that are encrypted using the
connection key CK.
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Once users x and y receive their respective reply messages from the network
and recognize that they are connected, they proceed to execute an authentication
protocol in order that each of them authenticates the other. But what does it mean
for a user to authenticate another in this network (where users have no identities)?
We answer this question in the next Section.
6.2 User Authentication in the Network
Consider the case where a user x with a pseudonym nmx was connected to (and
communicated with) another user y with a pseudonym nmy as many as k times,
where k is at least one. Later, user x with its pseudonym nmx requests from the
network to be connected, for the (k + 1)-th time, to a user with the pseudonym
nmy and the network grants user x its request. Now how can either user (x or y,
respectively) be sure that it is connected to the same user (y or x, respectively) to
whom it was connected k times in the past?
This is not an easy question to answer. For example, it is possible that after
users x and y were connected k times in the past, user y gave up its pseudonym nmy
and a third user z later claimed nmy as one of its pseudonyms. Now, when user x
requests to be connected to a user with the pseudonym nmy, user x is connected to
user z instead of user y.
The answer to the above question is a new authentication protocol that we
designed for our network. When two users x and y are connected by the network, if
either of these two users, say user x, thinks that it had been connected to the other
user, user y, several times in the past, then executing the authentication protocol
by the two users x and y, can lead user x to know for sure whether the other user,
user y, is the same user to whom user x was connected several times in the past.
Our design of the authentication protocol is intended to defend against an
adversary that can perform two dangerous operations:
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i. Eavesdropping: The adversary can read every message that is sent between
any user and the network or between any two connected users in the network.
In particular, the adversary can read every registration message and can com-
pute and maintain an accurate copy of the registration table that is stored
in the network. Note that the exchanged messages between (connected) users
are encrypted using connection keys and so the adversary cannot understand
them, even if it does read them.
ii. Impersonation: The adversary can pretend to be a user in the network and
send a message to the network or to any other user in the network. The
adversary can also pretend to be the network and send a message to any
user. Each message, that is sent by the adversary, is composed using the
knowledge that the adversary has gained from reading all the sent messages
in the network. For example, the adversary can “replay” a message that has
been sent earlier in the network.
Note that the adversary cannot impersonate the network, because we assume
that (1) the network has a private key whose corresponding public key is known
to all users in the network, and that (2) the network uses its private key to
sign every (reply) message that the network sends to a user.
The objective of the adversary is to be connected to a user x in the network
and then to use the authentication protocol to convince user x that it (the adversary)
is the same user y to whom user x was connected several times in the past.
The designed authentication protocol is simple enough. When two users x
and y are connected, each of the two users selects a new pseudonym and a new
“token”. Then the two users exchange their new pseudonyms and new tokens en-
crypted using the connection key CK. Let nmx and tkx be the new pseudonym
and new token selected by user x and let nmy and tky be the new pseudonym and
new token selected by user y. After exchanging their new pseudonyms and tokens,
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the two users x and y end up with the following tuple which defines their next
authenticated connection:
[nmx, tkx, nmy, tky]
Now assume that user x wants to establish the next connection to user y,
and then x initiates the connection protocol indicating that its pseudonym is nmx
and that it wants to be connected to a user with the pseudonym nmy. There are
two cases that need to be considered in this scenario.
In the first case, the network connects user x with the correct user y where
both x and y have the same two tokens. In this case, the authentication protocol
proceeds as follows: user x sends tkx to user y which checks that the received token
is the expected one and sends in turn tky to user x which checks that the received
token is the expected one.
In the second case, the network connects user x with a user z, different from
the correct user y. (This could have happened as follows. First, user y decided
to give up its pseudonym nmy, then later user z decided to claim nmy as one of
its pseudonyms. Thus when user x requested to be connected with the pseudonym
nmy, the network connects user x to user z which does not know either of the two
tokens tkx and tky.)
In this second case, the authentication protocol proceeds as follows. User x
sends tkx to user z which sends back an arbitrary value (different from tky) to user
x which recognizes that it is communicating with a different user than user y. Thus,
each of the two users concludes that it is communicating with the other user for the
first time.
In either case, at the end of the authentication protocol, user x selects a new
pseudonym nm′x and a new token tk
′
x and sends them to the other user, whether y
or z. Also, the other user, whether y or z, selects a new pseudonym nm′y and a new
token tk′y to user x. Thus both user x and the other user, whether y or z, end up
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So far, we outlined broadly the three protocols in our network (where users
have no identities): the registration protocol, the connection protocol, and the au-
thentication protocol. In the registration protocol, each user sends a registration
message to the network every T seconds. In the connection protocol, a user x sends
a request message to the network requesting to be connected to another user y,
and the network replies by sending reply messages to both x and y informing them
that they have been connected. In the authentication protocol, two connected users
exchange and verify their tokens in order to check whether they had communicated
earlier.
In the next three Sections, we discuss these three protocols in great detail.
6.3 Registration Protocol
The function of the registration protocol is to allow each user x in the network to
periodically register its current address adx and its current pseudonym set NMx.
This protocol also allows each user to periodically register its current registration
key RKx, which is a public key, selected at random by user x, whose corresponding
private key is known only to user x.
The registration protocol requires that, every T seconds, each user x sends to
the network a registration message of the following form: (adx, NMx, RKx, tx, signx)
where adx is the current address of some user, and NMx is the current pseudonym
set of the user at adx, and RKx is the current registration key of the user at adx,
and tx is the real time, or timestamp, of the user at adx when this user sends the
registration message, and signx is the message signature signed by the private key
that corresponds to RKx.
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Table 6.1: Registration Table
address pseudonym set registration key timestamp
adx NMx RKx tx
ady NMy RKy ty
The network stores the data, that are contained in the received registration
messages into a table called the registration table. The registration table has four
columns, also called attributes, named address, pseudonym set, registration key, and
timestamp. The index attribute of this table is the address. Table 6.1 illustrates
the registration table when it has two tuples.
When the network receives a registration message (adx, NMx, RKx, tx, signx)
from a user at address adx, the network updates the registration table by executing
the following protocol:
Step 1: If the timestamp tx in the message is not “close” to the real time of
the network or if the message signature signx is not correct, then the network
discards the message and terminates the protocol.
Step 2: If the network finds no tuple in the registration table whose address
is adx, then the network adds the tuple [adx, NNx, RKx, tx] to the registra-
tion table, where NNx is the same set as NMx after removing from it every
pseudonym that already occurs in the registration table, and terminates the
protocol.






x] in the registration table
where adx = ad
′
x and RKx = RK
′
x, then the network replaces this tuple by
the tuple [adx, NNx, RKx, tx] in the registration table, where NNx is the same
set as NMx after removing from it every pseudonym that already occurs in
the registration table, and terminates the protocol.
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Periodically, the network checks the registration table and discards every
tuple that has not been updated for more than 2T seconds. Note that there are
three causes for a tuple [adx, NMx, RKx, tx] in the registration table not to be
updated for more than 2T seconds:
i. User x has failed or has quit the network.
ii. User x has changed its address from adx to ad
′
x (possibly because user x has
“moved” from one location to another).
iii. User x has changed its registration key from RKx to RK
′
x (possibly to prevent
its fixed registration key RKx from becoming a fixed identity of user x).
If user x fails or leaves the network, then its tuple in the registration table
remains unchanged for more than 2T seconds. This causes the network to remove
this tuple from the registration table.
If user x changes its address from adx to ad
′
x, then the first registration
message after the change will cause a new tuple (that has the new address ad′x) to
be added to the registration table, leaving the old tuple (that has the old address
adx) unchanged. The old tuple remains unchanged in the registration table for more
than 2T seconds, causing the network to remove this old tuple from the registration
table.
If user x changes its registration key from RKx to RK
′
x, then the registration
messages after this change will be discarded, leaving the tuple of user x in the
registration table unchanged. This tuple of user x (with the old registration key
RKx) remains unchanged in the registration table for more than 2T seconds, causing
the network to remove this tuple from the registration table. Once this tuple is
removed, the next registration message from user x will cause a new tuple of user x
(with a new registration key RK ′x) to be added to the registration table.
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6.4 Connection Protocol
The function of the connection protocol is to allow two users in the network to
become connected to one another. This means that
i. each of the two users knows the current address of the other user (and so the
two users can now exchange messages), and
ii. the two users share a symmetric key, called their connection key CK, that
they can use to encrypt and decrypt their exchanged messages.
The connection protocol consists of three messages: a request message from
any user x to the network requesting that user x be connected to another user y
followed by two reply messages from the network to the two users x and y informing
them that they have been connected.
When a user x with a pseudonym nmx wants to establish a connection with
another user y with a pseudonym nmy, user x sends to the network a request message
of the form: (adx, nmx, nmy, tx, signx) where adx is the currently registered address
of user x, and nmx is a currently registered pseudonym of user x, and nmy is a
currently registered pseudonym of user y, and tx is the real time, or timestamp, of
user x when it sent the request message, and signx is the message signature signed
by the private key that corresponds to the current registration key RKx of user x.
When the network receives a connection request message (adx, nmx, nmy, tx,
signx), it executes the following protocol:
Step 1: If the timestamp tx in the request message is not “close” to the real
time of the network, or if the network finds no tuple in the registration table
whose address is adx, then the network discards the message and terminates
the protocol.
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Table 6.2: Authentication Table of User x
my-pseudonym my-token other-pseudonym other-token
nmx tkx nmy tky
Table 6.3: Authentication Table of User y
my-pseudonym my-token other-pseudonym other-token
nmy tky nmx tkx















y] where adx = ad
′
x, and nmx ∈
NM ′x, and nmy ∈ NM ′y
then the network does the following:
– it selects at random a symmetric connection key CK.
– it sends a reply message of the form (adx, nmx, ad
′
y, nmy, tx, {CK}RK′x , signN )
to ad′x.
– it sends a reply message of the form (adx, nmx, ad
′
y, nmy, tx, {CK}RK′y , signN )
to ad′y.
where signN is the message signature signed by the private key of the network,
whose corresponding public key is known to all users in network.
Otherwise, the network discards the message and terminates the protocol.
6.5 Authentication Protocol
When a user x wants to communicate with another user y, user x initiates the
connection protocol, presented in Section 6.4, in order to achieve two goals:
i. Each of the two users obtains the current address of the other user and so the
two users can start to exchange messages.
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ii. Each of the two users obtains a copy of the symmetric connection key CK,
and so the two users can encrypt and decrypt all their exchanged messages.
After the connection between users x and y is established, and before x and
y can start exchanging data messages over the established connection, users x and y
need to execute the authentication protocol in order that each of them can determine
whether or not the established connection is the “first” connection between x and
y.
Consider the case where this established connection is not the first one be-
tween users x and y. In this case, users x and y have agreed on four items in their
last established connection:
1. nmx: is a new pseudonym for user x.
2. nmy: is a new pseudonym for user y.
3. tkx: is a new token for user x.
4. tky: is a new token for user y.
Moreover, each of the two users has stored these agreed-on four items in a
local table, called the authentication table, of the user. Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show
the authentication table of user x and user y, respectively.
Note that each authentication table has four attributes named: my pseudonym,
my token, other pseudonym, and other token.
Thus, in this case, before user x sent a request message to initiate the current
connection to user y, user x needed to consult its authentication table in order to
determine its own pseudonym and the pseudonym of user y that needed to be
included in the request message.
The authentication protocol between user x, with pseudonym nmx, and user
y, with pseudonym nmy, proceeds in seven steps as follows:
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Step 1: If user x finds in its authentication table a tuple of the form:
[nmx, tkx, nmy, tky], then user x assigns to its boolean flag connx the value
true. Otherwise, user x assigns to its flag connx the value false.
Step 2: User x sends the message {u}CK to ady where the value of u depends
on the value of connx as follows. If connx is true, then u is the token tkx in
the above tuple. Otherwise, u is selected at random by user x.
Step 3: When user y receives {u}CK from adx, then user y sends {v}CK to
adx, where v is computed as follows. If user y finds in its authentication table
a tuple of the form [nmy, tky, nmx, u], then v is the token tky in the tuple, and
user y assigns its flag conny the value true. Otherwise, v is selected at random
by user y, and user y assigns its flag conny the value false.
Step 4: When user x receives {v}CK from ady, then user x computes the
value of its flag connx as follows. If user x finds in its authentication table
a tuple of the form: [nmx, tkx, nmy, v], then user x assigns its flag connx the
value true. Otherwise, user x assigns connx the value false.
Step 5: User x sends {nm′x, tk′x}CK to ady, where nm′x and tk′x are a new
pseudonym and token selected at random by user x. Then, user y sends
{nm′y, tk′y}CK to adx, where nm′y and tk′y are a new pseudonym and token
selected at random by user y.
Step 6: If flag connx is true, then user x removes the tuple [nmx, tkx, nmy, tky]







y] to its authentication table.
Also, if flag conny is true, then user y removes the tuple [nmy, tky, nmx, tkx]







x] to its authentication table.
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Step 7: If the two flags connx and conny are both true, then each of the two
connected users x and y is sure that the other user is the same one to which
it was connected in the past.
Otherwise, the two flags connx and conny are both false and each of the two
users x and y is sure that the other user is a new one to which it was not
connected in the past.
After executing the above authentication protocol, the two users x and y can
now start to exchange data messages encrypted using the connection key CK.














x] in its authentication table. As long as these two tuples remain
in their respective authentication tables, the two users x and y can authenticate one
another correctly in the next time they become connected in the future. However,







y] from its authentication table. In this case, the next time
users x and y become connected, their execution of the authentication protocol will
indicate (incorrectly) that users x and y are being connected for the first time.
Note that whenever a user x decides to drop one of its pseudonyms nmx from
its pseudonym set NMx, then user x should also drop from its authentication table
any tuple where the my-pseudonym attribute has the value nmx.
6.6 Protocol Security
In the previous Sections, we have described the working of a network without iden-
tities. Our network has three protocols – the registration protocol, the connection
protocol, and the authentication protocol. Our description shows that, even if there
are no permanent identities, a user x can find another user (say y, though x does not
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know the identity of y) by searching for his pseudonym (say nmy). In this Section,
we focus on another important aspect of the network, its security.
In this Section, we assume two users x and y are communicating using our
network. The adversary is another user z. The powers of the adversary are as listed
in Section 6.2.
We now demonstrate that our three protocols are designed to defend against
many attacks that could potentially compromise the security of the network. We
provide seven example attacks that can be launched by adversary z, and show how
our protocols defeat these attacks.
Pseudonym Theft Attack
In this attack, adversary z seeks to acquire pseudonym nmy, which is currently held
by user y. The network, which maintains the registration table, does not allow two
users to simultaneously register the same pseudonym. Hence, as long as nmy is
registered to y, z will fail to acquire nmy.
We note that the registration protocol is soft-state: if a time period of 2T
passes, and y does not send a message to update its tuple in the registration table,
then the entire tuple is discarded. z can now acquire the pseudonym nmy. But z
cannot cause this to happen (unless y voluntarily leaves the network), because z
cannot delete registration messages sent by y to the network.
Address Theft Attack
This attack is similar to the one above. z seeks to acquire address ady, currently
held by user y. We can show the network is secure against this attack by adapting
our argument for the case of pseudonym theft. The network only allows one user to
be present at an address, so z cannot capture an address that is already registered.
z can send registration messages to claim the address – but as z does not have the
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private key corresponding to RKy, these messages have at least one of the following
two characteristics:
1. Wrong registration key. The message does not contain RKy.
2. Not properly signed. The message contains key RKy, but is not signed by the
private key corresponding to RKy.
In both these cases, the registration protocol simply discards the messages.
Also, z cannot prevent y from updating its registration tuple. Hence z cannot steal
an address from y, while y is in the network.
Wrong Address Attack
In this attack, z tries to acquire an address ad′z that is not its true address adz.
Given that ad′z is not the address of any other user, z succeeds in obtaining this
address. But this attack is of no practical value – z successfully acquires a new
address, but cannot send messages from it or receive messages sent to it (because it
is not physically present at this address). Hence, even though this attack succeeds,
it is of no importance.
Message Forging Attack
In this attack, z sends messages, either to the network or to a user (say x), which
purport to be from user y. We have demonstrated, in our discussion of the address
theft attack above, that z cannot successfully forge registration protocol messages.
In the case of connection protocol messages, note that every message is signed
by the sender’s private key. Consider a message that claims to be from a user with
pseudonym nmy, where nmy is in fact a pseudonym of user y (and not user z).
The network can verify the signature in the message (because, by inspecting the
registration table, the network can find the public key to check the signature: it is
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the registration key of the user with pseudonym nmy). z does not have the private
key of y, and therefore cannot forge connection protocol messages to look like they
are from y. Similarly, z does not have the private key of the network, and cannot
forge connection protocol messages to look like they were sent by the network.
All the messages in the authentication protocol are encrypted by a shared key
CK, which is not known by z: CK is randomly chosen by the network, and is sent to
the users x and y, encrypted with their respective registration keys. Consequently, z
cannot even read, much less write messages encrypted by CK. Hence, we conclude
that z cannot successfully forge messages in any of our three protocols.
Replay Attack
In the replay attack, the adversary makes additional copies of a legitimate message,
which was originally sent by another user (or by the network), and sends the copies
to the destination of the original. In other words, z causes multiple copies (rather
than a single copy) of a message to arrive at its destination.
In order to solve the problem of replay attacks, we design the messages in our
protocols to bear timestamps. If the recipient receives a message which is delayed,
it discards the message as being stale.
Impersonation Attack
In the impersonation attack, z tries to convince a user x that he (z) is in fact another
user y, known to x as nmy. Our connection protocol ensures that, when a user x
believes that he is connected to a user with pseudonym nmy, this is in fact true. It
is therefore essential for z to register pseudonym nmy. As long as y is present in
the system, and has pseudonym nmy, this is also impossible: the network does not
allow multiple users to share the same pseudonym. But it is possible for y to leave
the system, in which case z can acquire the pseudonym nmy.
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Suppose z does acquire nmy, and obtains a connection to nmx. z still fails
to impersonate y, because, in addition to the use of pseudonyms, x and y also use
a pair of tokens to authenticate themselves to each other. z does not know tky, the
token used by y (the chance of guessing tky correctly is vanishingly small). Hence,
z cannot supply tky, as required by the authentication protocol, and x can identify
z as being distinct from y.
Is it possible for z to know tky? Note that, if instead of initiating the con-
nection, z simply waits for x to connect to nmy, then in accordance with the au-
thentication protocol x supplies its own token tkx. It is natural to question whether
z can leverage this feature to obtain tky.
Unfortunately for adversary z, this is not possible. The only user who can
send tky, is y, who has already left the network. To counter this argument, suppose
we consider a different scenario, where z obtains tky before y leaves the network.
Even in this case, this attack is not possible. y will only send tky to nmx. The only
way z can obtain tky is by waiting for x to leave the network, then acquiring nmx
and waiting for y to contact nmx. But in this case, x has already left the network, so
obtaining tky is useless: there is no longer a party who can be deceived using token
tky. (Note that, if x does rejoin the network later, he starts with a new pseudonym
and a fresh authentication table; token tky no longer authenticates y to x.)
Man-In-The-Middle Attack
In the Man-in-the-middle or Janus attack, adversary z simultaneously impersonates
x to y and y to x. x and y believe that their conversation is private, but in fact all
messages are seen (in the clear) by z.
Our analysis of this attack follows directly from that of the impersonation
attack. In order to impersonate x to y, z must have the pseudonym nmx; to imper-
sonate y to x, he must have nmy. If in fact, he manages to acquire both pseudonyms,
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nmx and nmy, then this shows that x and y have left the network. There is no user
in the network who can be affected by the attack. Hence, our network is robust
against Man-in-the-middle attacks.
6.7 Related Work
The problem of anonymous communication over a network is an old and respected
problem, and has inspired a considerable amount of research. The original papers
proposing architectures for anonymous networks were MIX-net [15], DC-net [16],
and Crowds [99]. MIX-net, the original anonymous communication system, provided
untraceable email by making use of public key cryptography to hide the participants
and contents of communications. Email only requires periodic deliveries, and DC-
net was proposed for applications requiring continual delivery over unconditionally
secure channels. Crowds, an application-level protocol, uses probabilistic random
forwarding. Unfortunately, it has scalability problems, as it depends on a centralized
admission control server. Most subsequent solutions have implemented variants of
the same basic idea: to have nodes relaying traffic, so it is hard to determine where
a message originated. Perhaps the best known, Tor [28] attempts to provide a
variant of Onion Routing [112]. Tor uses directory servers that maintain router
information. A user can send (encrypted) traffic on a long path through many
proxy servers, before a Tor node finally sends the (unencrypted) message to its final
destination. Unfortunately, Tor has well-known scaling problems.
In order to resolve the scalability problem of Tor, some authors propose peer-
to-peer networks to relay messages. One such solution, APFS [109], provides two
variants: 1) unicast communication with a central coordinator, and 2) multicast
routing. Another solution by Tarzan [38], a P2P anonymous IP network overlay,
extends MIX-net using ideas very similar to Tor: layered encryption and multihop
routing. Further, Tarzan uses gossip-based protocols for peer discovery, rather than
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a central directory. Despite all these scalability improvements, Tarzan still has
problems scaling to large networks.
Distributed hash tables (DHTs) are often used to try and overcome the scal-
ability and security problems of the P2P-based approach. For instance, Salsa [88] is
a structured approach to organizing highly distributed anonymous communications
systems. Salsa uses its own secure lookup operation over a custom DHT to locate
forwarder nodes. Cashmere [129] focuses on the fragility of paths through a network
when there is anonymous communication. Its solution is to use regions in the overlay
name space as mixes, rather than single nodes; this reduces the probability of a mix
failure. AP3 [82], a cooperative decentralized anonymous communication service, is
similar to Crowds: it selects random relays, and implements routing dynamically.
Despite this extensive body of research, the problem of constructing a truly
secure anonymous network is still open. Mittal and Borisov [83] demonstrate how
to compromise Salsa and AP3 with information leaks. More recently, Tran et al.
have discovered information leaks in Salsa and Cashmere, Hintz in Safeweb using
SSL [54], and Ristenpart et al. in cloud computing-based anonymous networks [101].
There continues to be a great deal of research into the problem of making it hard
to trace the IP address of the initiator who originates traffic.
However, a characteristic feature of all the above authors is that they univer-
sally assume that IP address is identity. The aim of these networks is to obfuscate
the link between the user of a network, or more precisely his role on the network,
and his IP address, i.e. his identity. The above authors do not consider exactly
what constitutes an identity, and what it means to protect the identity of a user.
This is a glaring shortcoming, considering the critical importance of the concept
of identity: not only is the word itself ubiquitous in security (for example, con-
sider the Department of Homeland Security’s recent draft, “The National Strategy
for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace” [1]), it is the basis of many concepts such as
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access policy, information integrity protocols, and reputation systems.
In this Chapter, we attempt to define the concept of ‘identity’, and suggest
that an identity is a persistent, unique, and undisputed (hence distributed by a
central authority) name. Having provided this definition, we then ask the very
important question, “Is it possible to have a network without identities?” The
question seems absurd at first glance - how is it possible to trust some users, and give
them exclusive rights and privileges (not enjoyed by other users), without identities?
But we show that, in fact, it is indeed possible to build a network where users
authenticate themselves to each other using only their pseudonyms – “temporary
names” adopted for use on the network – without the use of fixed identities. Further,
we demonstrate that this network is highly resistant to a wide variety of attacks.
We suggest that this may in fact be an example of a novel class of networks.
6.8 Concluding Remarks
The usual structure of networks, where users are assigned unique identities, makes
communication between users – as well as development of relationships between
them – simple. But this simple structure comes at a price. Clearly, associating
an identity with a user leads to loss of anonymity; there may be concerns about
reputation – other users can judge one’s actions; and the network itself may show
biased behavior. Most importantly, there exist attacks which seek to steal a user’s
identity.
In this Chapter, we present the outline of a network in which users do not
have identities. Users are contacted by searching for their “pseudonyms”, which
they change frequently. Authentication is done by users themselves, not by the
certification of a central authority. In this network, as there is no identity, there is
no identity theft. Further, we show in Section 6.6 that the network is robust against
many different kinds of attacks, notably the impersonation and Man-in-the-middle
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attacks.
Besides the theoretical novelty of the idea, we are pleased to report that it
shows considerable promise for future research. The entire concept of a network
without identities is very interesting, as it opens up the question of inter-user rela-
tionships without external reputations; indeed, we venture to suggest that this may
be a whole new kind of network, distinct from both traditional client-server and
reputation-based peer-to-peer networks. In our own immediate future work, we are
attempting to develop our network in more detail, so that it becomes robust against




In this dissertation, we proposed five authentication protocols to address five critical
problems related to authentication over computer networks.
In Chapter 2, we observed that HTTP suffers from many prevalent attacks –
server impersonation, message modification, and cookie theft and injection attacks.
This observation motivated us to design HTTPI, an HTTP with Integrity. HTTPI
is lightweight like HTTP and compatible with middle boxes like caching proxies and
yet provides some security guarantees – server authentication, message integrity,
and cookie integrity.
In Chapter 3, we observed that HTTPS is vulnerable to human mistakes and
Phishing and Pharming attacks. Based on these observations, we designed TLP to
replace TLS and the standard password protocol. TLP provides a new class of
brown pages and a new login protocol to defend against these attacks.
In Chapter 4, we argued that the usual combination of TLS and the stan-
dard password protocol is vulnerable to a variety of Phishing attacks, and proposed
to replace the standard password protocol with the Two-Way Password Protocol
(TPP). TLS is vulnerable to Phishing attacks because clients do not have infor-
mation to decide whether the displayed web site is what users intended. In order
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to defend against a variety of Phishing attacks, we designed TPP to complement
the standard password protocol with TLS. TPP is improved over TLP since TPP
is more lightweight than TLP by reducing the number of messages. In addition
to that, TPP is more compatible with the current system, TLS with the standard
protocol than TLP by replacing only the standard password protocol.
In Chapter 5, we observed that every sensor in a sensor network is required
to store n − 1 symmetric keys for secure communication if there are n sensors.
Considering the storage constraints of sensor networks, it is important to reduce
the number of key and support secure communications. Existing keying protocols
focused on the reduction of keys and they are still vulnerable to collusion attacks.
We designed Best Keying Protocol (BKP) to require every sensor to store only
(n + 1)/2 and to defend against collusion attacks.
In Chapter 6, we argued that most networks are designed with “identities”
because identities facilitate the working of networks. However, identities create
security problems – anonymity loss, identity theft, and misplaced trust. There can
be two approaches to solve these problems. One is to defend against every attack
related with identities and the other one is to design a network without identities.
We took the second approach to design a network without identities because it has
not previously been attempted. We found that addresses and pseudonyms cannot
be used for identities because they are not fixed. With addresses and pseudonyms,
we designed anonymous authentication for a network without identities.
These five protocols make a suite of authentication protocols. This suite of
authentication protocols can be used to authenticate clients and servers for a mutual
authentication depending on applications. Secure applications like bank web sites
requiring strong mutual authentications can adopt TLP or TPP with TLS. Most web
sites not requiring confidentiality can use HTTPI to defend against impersonation,
message modification, and cookie theft and injection attacks. BKP can be used for
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a mutual authentication under the constraints of resources such as sensor networks.
Lastly, ITY can be used to authenticate anonymous communications.
7.1 Future Research
In this dissertation, we have presented five authentication protocols that can be
deployed in various environments of computer networks including the World Wide
Web, sensor networks, and anonymous networks. The ideas used in designing these
five authentication protocols can be also used in designing new authentication pro-
tocols in other environments:
1. Virtualization Environments
2. Delegation Environments
3. Cloud Computing Environments
Next, we discuss the new challenges of authentication in these three environments.
Virtualization Environments: Virtualization has become the norm in enterprise
computing and is also widely used by individuals. Virtualization enables a separate
identity to each virtual machine and if a computer has multiple virtual machines,
the computer can assume the multiple identities of these machines. In this case,
virtual machines might need to communicate with one another and authentication
among multiple virtual machines needs to be considered. If authentication does
not exist in this environment, any malicious virtual machine can eavesdrop and
impersonate to any other virtual machines and can subvert this system. Thus, an
effective authentication protocol for virtual environments needs to be designed.
Delegation Environments: The World Wide Web has seen a different model
other than the client-server model. In client-server model, the resource in a server
is accessed by a client. On the other hand, web applications introduce a third party
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to access the resource in a server. A resource owner allows a client to access the
server. For example, you can allow Facebook to access your Gmail account to find
your friends. In this case, Facebook is a client, Gmail is a server, and the contact
lists in Gmail is your resource in the server. This environment is not uncommon in
web applications and this kind of authentication is called delegated authentication.
This delegated authentication is required for the client to access the resource in the
server. The authentication protocol, OAuth 2.0 [52] has been proposed to support
delegated authentication. Unfortunately, the security of OAuth 2.0 is based on the
security of HTTPS [51], which is known to be vulnerable to Phishing and Pharming
attacks. Therefore, a new authentication protocol, that is proven secure against
Phishing and Pharming attacks, is needed to support delegated authentication.
Cloud Computing Environments: Cloud computing is an emerging new parad-
igm of computing [7]. Cloud computing has created new challenges for authenti-
cation because cloud computing involves both virtualization and delegation envi-
ronments. In order to use the services in cloud computing, a new authentication
protocol, that supports an integrated authentication for virtualization and delegated
authentication, is needed.
Designing an authentication protocol is not a trivial task. As new tech-
nologies emerge and existing systems become more complicated, it becomes more




[1] National strategy for trusted identities in cyberspace. Department of Home-
land Security, June 2010.
[2] Ben Adida. SessionLock: Securing Web Sessions against Eavesdropping. In
WWW ’08: Proceeding of the 17th international conference on World Wide
Web, pages 517–524, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[3] Amitanand Aiyer, Lorenzo Alvisi, and Mohamed Gouda. Key grids: A proto-
col family for assigning symmetric keys. In Proceedings of IEEE International
Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), pages 178–186, 2006.
[4] R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, and S. Rose. DNS Security
Introduction and Requirements. RFC 4033 (Proposed Standard), March 2005.
[5] R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, and S. Rose. Protocol Modi-
fications for the DNS Security Extensions. RFC 4035 (Proposed Standard),
March 2005. Updated by RFC 4470.
[6] R. Arends, R. Austein, M. Larson, D. Massey, and S. Rose. Resource Records
for the DNS Security Extensions. RFC 4034 (Proposed Standard), March
2005. Updated by RFC 4470.
[7] Michael Armbrust, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith, Anthony D. Joseph, Randy
Katz, Andy Konwinski, Gunho Lee, David Patterson, Ariel Rabkin, Ion Stoica,
147
and Matei Zaharia. A view of cloud computing. Commun. ACM, 53(4):50–58,
April 2010.
[8] D. Atkins and R. Austein. Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System
(DNS). RFC 3833 (Informational), August 2004.
[9] Theodore Ts B. Clifford Neuman. Kerberos: An authentication service for
computer networks. IEEE Communications Magazine, pages 33–44, Septem-
ber 1994.
[10] Bank of America. http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/sitekey/.
[11] Adam Barth, Collin Jackson, and John C. Mitchell. Robust defenses for cross-
site request forgery. In CCS ’08:Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2008), 2008.
[12] Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt. Encrypted key exchange: Password-
based protocols secure against dictionary attacks. In IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON
RESEARCH IN SECURITY AND PRIVACY, pages 72–84, 1992.
[13] Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt. Augmented encrypted key exchange:
A password-based protocol secure against dictionary attacks and password file
compromise. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
pages 244–250, 1993.
[14] S. Blake-Wilson, M. Nystrom, D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen, and T. Wright.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions. RFC 4366 (Proposed Standard),
April 2006. Obsoleted by RFC 5246.
[15] David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2), February 1981.
148
[16] David Chaum. The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and
recipient untraceability. Journal of Cryptology, 1:65–75, 1988.
[17] Sonia Chiasson, P. C. van Oorschot, and Robert Biddle. A usability study
and critique of two password managers. In USENIX-SS’06: Proceedings of the
15th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, pages 1–1, Berkeley, CA,
USA, 2006. USENIX Association.
[18] Taehwan Choi, Hrishikesh B. Acharya, and Mohamed G. Gouda. The best
keying protocol for sensor networks. In 2nd IEEE International Workshop on
Data Security and PrivAcy in wireless Networks, pages 1–6, 2011.
[19] Taehwan Choi, Hrishikesh B. Acharya, and Mohamed G. Gouda. Is That You?
Authentication in a Network without Identities. In GLOBECOM, pages 1–5.
IEEE, 2011.
[20] Taehwan Choi, Hrishikesh B. Acharya, and Mohamed G. Gouda. TPP: The
Two-Way Password Protocol. In Haohong Wang, Jin Li, George N. Rouskas,
and Xiaobo Zhou, editors, ICCCN, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2011.
[21] Taehwan Choi and Mohamed G. Gouda. HTTPI: An HTTP with Integrity. In
The First International Workshop on Privacy, Security and Trust in Mobile
and Wireless Systems (MobiPST 2011), 2011b.
[22] Taehwan Choi, Sooel Son, Mohamed G. Gouda, and Jorge Arturo Cobb.
Pharewell to phishing. In Sandeep S. Kulkarni and André Schiper, edi-
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